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This research offers a framework that explains how observers respond to moral 
violations when considering the amount of power and status held by violators. It 
follows the group processes literature on the characteristics of power and status. A 
proposed theory describes that prior to witnessing moral violations, observers develop 
moral expectations about potential violators on the basis of the levels of power and 
status attributed to the violators. When the moral violations occur, the moral 
expectations about the violators, as well as the resources available to the violators, in 
turn, affect the judgment and punishment decisions of the observers toward the 
violators. An online vignette study and a laboratory experiment test my predictions 
based on the proposed theory by varying the relative levels of perceived power and 
status between evaluation targets (i.e., violators) and evaluators (i.e., observers). 
Vignettes used in Study 1 described that observers had lower, equal, or higher 
power/status compared to violators in hypothetical scenarios. In Study 2, observers 
  
were assigned with either lower or higher power/status relative to violators in a group 
interaction setting in which the observers experienced differential risks of retaliation 
from the violators. Both studies assessed expectations of observers about the moral 
character of potential violators before exposing the observers to details of a moral 
violation committed by the designated violators. Punishment decisions of observers 
examined in Study 1 were attitudinal measures while those in Study 2 were based on 
behavioral reactions. 
 Results indicate that prior to the immoral incident, observers developed lower 
moral expectations about violators with greater power and higher moral expectations 
about violators holding greater status. However, these expectations did not always 
translate into moral judgment and punishment. While viewing the violation as immoral 
regardless of power/status held by the violators, depending on the context, observers 
might or might not penalize the violators differentially across the power/status spectra. 
Fears of retaliation from violators who utilized resources attached to varied power and 
status positions did not affect how observers punished the violators. Therefore, results 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
People use moral values to govern behavior and construct an understanding of 
what is right and wrong in the social world. When witnessing an immoral incident, 
observers may experience negative emotions and feel motivated to take action to 
restore the moral balance. Importantly, the judgment and response of the observer to a 
particular moral violation can be greatly affected by the levels of power and status held 
by the violator. The Harvey Weinstein sexual abuse scandal is an instructive example. 
In the wake of the Hollywood producer’s downfall, scores of sexual misconduct 
accusations emerged against prominent male figures in the entertainment, political, and 
corporate industries. Most of these alleged abusers wielded tremendous power and 
influence at the time the offenses were committed, enjoying a high social standing prior 
to the revelations. As the responses of observers can potentially make a gigantic 
difference in both addressing concerns of the victims and devising remedies for sexual 
exploitation, a critical question emerges: why had the individuals who had been made 
aware of the abuses not taken serious or any action at all? Those subject to the power 
and status of the violators might have chosen silence amid fears of retaliation. Others 
not directly connected to the violators could still have been influenced by the high 
social standing, and thus did not react critically enough to the incidents. 
 The observer’s reaction to immorality is the focus of my dissertation. According 
to the example above, it is necessary to differentiate between the effects on observers 
who simply perceive and on those who personally experience the power and status of 





this context (e.g., the public’s reaction), my dissertation centers on the judgment 
process of observers who are situated in immediate power and status relations with 
violators. Such definite relations put the observers in a position to be affected by the 
violators or to be more likely to witness an immoral action. 
  The aims of my dissertation are three-fold. First, I ask do power and status affect 
observers of moral violations differently? Second, I explore how the relative power and 
status between observers and violators translate into responses to immorality. Third, I 
evaluate how and why observers would punish when they are subject to the power and 
status of violators. 
I argue that the moral judgment process develops in multiple layers, a process 
in which moral expectations, as well as resources accessible to individuals at varied 
power and status positions, all play definitive roles. A wealth of investigation indicates 
that variable amounts of power and status are associated with different behavioral 
outcomes (Blader and Chen 2012; Blader, Shirako, and Chen 2016; Fast, Halevy, and 
Galinsky 2012), and that incongruities between expected and perceived behavior cause 
cognitive dissonance for the observers of such behavior (Festinger 1957). With respect 
to the previous example, before learning about the sexual abuse and assault allegations, 
did colleagues or employees expect those high-profile men to act morally in their day-
to-day business? Did such expectations affect moral judgment and sanctioning 
preferences once the immoral activities were realized? Further, were the observers’ 
choices of corrective action taken (or lack thereof) influenced by the resources 





My dissertation offers a framework to describe the ways power and status affect 
moral judgment and punishment. I propose that people develop moral expectations 
about an observation target on the basis of the levels of power and status attributed to 
the target person. When the observation target commits a violation (i.e., becomes a 
violator), the moral expectations about the violator, as well as the resources attached to 
the power and status positions that the violator retains, in turn, affect the judgment and 
punishment decisions of the observer toward the violator. Importantly, understanding 
the moral implications of power and status can provide a comprehensive approach to 
addressing abusive behavior and safeguarding vulnerable individuals from future 
cruelty. 
 To aid in the achievement of these goals, my dissertation first seeks to 
investigate the association between power, status, and morality. Research has 
established a link between expectations of morality and status, demonstrating that 
people tend to expect high-status individuals to treat others fairly (Willer 2009). 
Conversely, although the act of using power is perceived as selfish and greedy (Willer, 
Troyer, and Lovaglia 2005; Willer et al. 2012), scholars have yet to probe the 
impressions and moral expectations about powerful individuals prior to observing 
power use. Additionally, the relationship between moral expectations and lack of power 
or status has received insufficient attention. When compared to a perceived medium 
level, it remains unclear whether, and to what extent, the perceived least amount of 
power and status affect an observer’s moral expectations, or whether they have inverse 





Answers to these questions become more important when it relates to 
comparing the effects of power and status on moral expectations. While the literature 
indicates a potential negative association of morality with higher power and a positive 
association with higher status, it is unclear how the two constructs effect changes when 
they are examined together. As power and status typically vary together yet appear to 
produce opposing moral expectations, the fundamental inter-relationship between 
power and status represents a significant topic of inquiry. 
My dissertation explores the resilience of power and status hierarchies despite 
disruptions of moral codes. Although moral expectations are useful when helping to 
make sense of observed action and provoking sentiments (Haidt 2012), do judgment 
and emotions necessarily translate into observers’ sanctioning behavior? The decision 
to punish violations is a function of social, psychological, and normative factors. With 
the incorporation of moral expectations, I further examine how power, influence, and 
other resources available to the violators affect the degree of punishment they may have 
imposed on them. 
 With an emphasis on moral expectations, I propose a theory that aims to explain 
the effects of power and status on moral judgment and punishment. To test my proposed 
theory, I conducted two independent studies. Study 1 adopted an online vignette design 
that developed associations of moral expectations with power and status, as well as 
serving as a basis for the effects on responses to moral violations. Study 2 
experimentally manipulated power and status in a controlled, laboratory environment, 
rigorously investigating the sanctioning behavior of observers who witnessed moral 





1 explored two contexts where the observers were perceiving or experiencing the power 
and status of the violators, Study 2 probed into the latter form where the observers were 
directly subject to the power and status of the violators. 
 In general, my findings demonstrate that while higher-status individuals are 
expected to carry higher moral values than those with lower status, the association of 
moral expectations with power is weak. As a result, when considering both effects of 
power and status, a person’s status more robustly predicts the moral expectations about 
this person. When witnessing moral violations, observers see the violations as 
unacceptable regardless of the levels of power and status held by the violators. 
Additionally, observers are likely to punish higher-power violators and lower-status 
violators more harshly than other types of violators. Furthermore, differential risks of 
retaliation from violators do not appear to affect how observers react to the violations. 
 The first chapter lays out the questions, motivation, and contributions 
underlying my dissertation research. Chapter 2 reviews research on power and status 
in groups, and their relationships with morality. In Chapter 3, I discuss the literature on 
moral judgment and punishment with the incorporation of moral expectations to 
describe power and status effects. Chapter 4 briefly summarizes the predictions and 
rationales developed in the previous two chapters. Chapter 5 describes the vignette 
design, results, and a discussion of Study 1. Chapter 6 outlines the laboratory 
experiment, results, and a discussion for Study 2. In the end, Chapter 7 provides a 
general discussion of my findings with implications and limitations as well as 






Chapter 2: Moral Expectation for Power and Status 
People often organize and stratify in groups on the basis of power and status. 
Although these two constructs are correlated, the ways they shape behavior and 
perception fundamentally differ. Drawing from the group processes tradition, I will 
briefly review the concepts of power and status as well as the relationship between the 
two constructs. I will then discuss the associations of power and status with moral 
expectations. 
 
Section 1 Power 
Consistent with the group processes research, I define power as the ability to 
achieve goals despite the wishes of others (Weber 1968). The use of power involves 
managing both tangible and intangible outcomes, with power deriving from the access 
to valued resources such as goods and information (Lovaglia 1999). An extreme 
example would be a monopoly having exclusive control over a type of commodity or 
service. This person possesses an immense advantage over everyone else in negotiating 
valuation and supply of that commodity or service because there are no substitutes or 
alternative trading partners. Therefore, the monopoly can ask for caches of jewelry, 
dinners with celebrities, or even a nuclear launch button in exchange for a piece of the 
valued supplies. 
The capability to acquire these favorable ends often occurs at the expense of 
others, however. Power is based on modifying the conduct of others in a desirable 





individual to overcome the resistance of others and be less dependent on outside 
cooperation (Emerson 1962). Following the example above, parties interested in 
obtaining a portion of the monopolized resources may go to their great lengths to lie or 
steal to satisfy the monopoly. On the other hand, the monopoly may not be concerned 
about potential opposition from the interested parties because s/he is able to resolve the 
conflict or simply find other parties who are willing to cooperate. 
 According to Emerson's (1962, 1972) understanding, to have power is to use 
power. Therefore, a person with power shall exercise it no matter how legitimately, 
infrequently, or discreetly. And yet, by exerting power, the person of power strengthens 
their dependence on the recipient and the power relation becomes contentious. 
Experimental evidence demonstrates that power differences in network exchanges 
induced negative emotions in low-power individuals (Lovaglia 1995; Willer, Lovaglia, 
and Markovsky 1997). Additionally, these low-power individuals assembled into a 
group, collaborating to reverse their power disadvantage when coalition opportunities 
arose (Simpson and Macy 2001). As a result, power relations can seem paradoxical for 
making individuals reliant on the power use while producing spirals of conflict between 
them. 
Moreover, to effectively impose their will on others, a powerful person is able 
to apply sanctions or produce credible threats of exercising such sanctions. Power can 
be utilized to either reward or punish others, with both occurrences making the 
recipients more dependent on and further subject to the utilized power (Molm 1990). 
For instance, year-end bonuses may be viewed as favors offered to employees by 





without consulting with the employees. In return, these employees are likely to become 
more motivated to maintain employment and accept harsher working conditions.  
Although coercive measures such as penalties and threats are typically 
unfavorable, the power to punish may still be utilized as a last resort to incentivize 
compliance (Molm 1997). With respect to the previous example, the employers can 
criticize, demote, or ultimately dismiss the employees. Accordingly, both the 
employees who witness and experience the punishment are likely to follow through 
with the guidance and demand on the job. Nonetheless, depending on the 
administration of punishment, these punitive strategies can cause conflicts as well as 
detrimental psychological effects in those suffering from the power use. For instance, 
imposing punishment on exchange partners could provoke hostility and animosity 
(Lawler 1986; Molm 1991). However, a degree of consistency in administering the 
punishment may help alleviate some of the negative reactions (Molm 1994). In 
summary, without proper implementations, antagonistic behavior and negative 
emotions are likely to increase with the frequency and magnitude of punishment. 
Power should be viewed as a relational concept, as people must be situated 
within social relationships to possess and demonstrate power. It is also relational in the 
sense that each individual has a certain amount of power compared to others. Therefore, 
power is not a personal disposition, but a construct attached to the structural position 
one holds in a social hierarchy (Cook and Emerson 1978; Skvoretz and Willer 1993). 
Its capacity hinges on the context and social locations and may not exert the same 





oversee a group of subordinates in the workplace, but with the same title, the supervisor 
cannot give orders to employees in different organizations. 
Taken together, a power relationship can appear self-contradictory. It grants 
higher-power persons the ability to achieve what they desire. Those conform to power 
may have to alter their behavior though not genuinely or out of intrinsic motivations 
(Harsanyi 1962). Even if the relationship may seem beneficial at first, as both higher-
power and lower-power parties grow more dependent on each other through power use, 
tensions are likely to escalate. 
 
Section 2 Status 
Following the group processes tradition, I define status as respect, prestige, and 
honor regarded by others (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972; Thye 2000). Expectation 
states theory describes a process of status formation in groups with collective goals or 
tasks. When certain group members are expected to offer valuable contributions, they 
will be encouraged to participate more often and their performances will be evaluated 
more favorably than those of others (Berger et al. 1977; Correll and Ridgeway 2003). 
In a sense, people confer status on the basis of perceived competence: they confer 
respect to valued group members whose opinions and actions then have influence over 
the rest of the group. 
As a theoretical extension, status characteristics theory explains the ways 
expectations come to be organized around individual attributes (Correll and Ridgeway 
2003). Specific status characteristics refer to skills or expertise tied to achieving a goal, 





such as gender and race, that are in fact remotely associated with ability yet are 
considered by group members to be highly associated with those abilities. In recent 
years, research applying the program of expectation states theory has broadened the 
scope of conditions beyond task-oriented and group-based settings. For instance, 
Correll and colleagues (2007) identified motherhood as a disadvantaged status 
characteristic at job recruitment. Specifically, when evaluating a pool of candidates for 
the same position, participants in the study perceived mothers as less competent and 
recommended mothers less often for hire than other types of job applicants. 
The status order in groups is difficult to challenge for multiple reasons. First, 
because status formation often takes place unconsciously, people may see both of their 
attitudinal and behavioral changes as genuine. In other words, those occupying a lower 
status rank are less resistant to the influence of higher-status persons relative to their 
peers. Second, compared to the lenient judgment that higher-status individuals receive, 
those with lower status tend to face double standards which demand superior 
performances in order to be evaluated as equally competent (Foschi 2000). Therefore, 
moving upward in a status hierarchy seems harder for those starting out at a lower 
standing. Additionally, their questioning about individuals at higher-status positions 
may not be taken seriously. Third, legitimacy works as a self-fulfilling prophecy that 
prompts people to believe that the characteristics they draw upon appropriately assign 
others and themselves into different positions (Ridgeway and Berger 1986; Ridgeway, 
Johnson, and Diekema 1994). As a result, the status formation process in groups is 





While the theoretical program largely assumes a competence-based status 
attainment process, increasing evidence indicates that perceived dominance and 
prosociality also affect how people accord status. Indeed, individuals adopting a 
proactive and assertive behavioral style are found to wield considerable influence in 
group interactions (Cheng et al. 2013; Kilduff and Galinsky 2013). Previous 
investigations demonstrated that people award status to those who cooperate with 
others and make altruistic sacrifices for groups; in turn, higher-status members feel 
further encouraged to reciprocate (Hardy and Van Vugt 2006; Willer 2009). Status 
differences also facilitate collective action. Specifically, compared to low-status 
individuals, high-status individuals are more likely to make initial and costly 
contributions to groups as well as influence others into following their lead (Eckel, 
Fatas, and Wilson 2010; Sell 1997; Simpson, Willer, and Ridgeway 2012). In short, 
people attain status through a multitude of diverse routes. 
In general, relative to the unequal distribution of power, the status hierarchy is 
rather stable and tenacious. Higher-status members tend to perform frequently and 
receive positive feedback. Lower-status individuals may genuinely believe in the 
perceived competence and thus follow the lead of those holding greater status. 
Furthermore, their resistance to the influence of a high status is likely to be unsuccessful. 
 
Section 3 Relationship between Power and Status 
Power and status are inter-related in the sense that power can be utilized to 
attain status and vice versa. As evidenced by previous investigations, power may be 





status for proven competence in accumulating resources (Willer et al. 2012, 2005). The 
demonstrated control over valued supplies is considered to reflect one’s skills in 
acquiring those resources. An example would be the greater respect conferred to 
executive officers compared to their assistants. Second, high-power individuals can use 
their accumulated resources to earn respect and status by making philanthropic gestures 
(Willer et al. 2012). The rationale is that an abundance of possessions at one’s disposal 
simply affords one to obtain greater status. Third, utilizing power with constraint by 
relinquishing substantial profits may be seen as prosocial and acting in the interest of 
others (Willer et al. 2012). Logically, powerful persons can achieve what they desire 
without making concessions. Therefore, it appears to be a praiseworthy and respectful 
act to consider the wishes of others and let go of their own favorable ends. In summary, 
in this context, status is a reward to those who make good use of power. 
Likewise, status is often utilized to obtain power. In a meritocratic system the 
predominant belief is that positions are assigned on the basis of competence. That is, 
people are installed with power given their proven abilities. Indeed, educational 
credentials typically serve as an evaluation instrument for selecting and appointing 
individuals a responsibility and authority. Moreover, the ties that people want to 
establish with those of high status can be treated as a type of valued resources. Studies 
show that associational preferences for high-status individuals would provide these 
individuals with power advantages in exchange tasks (Thye 2000; Thye, Willer, and 
Markovsky 2006). Additionally, by seeking access to high-status groups in various 





to offer more valuable connections  (Sauder, Lynn, and Podolny 2012). As a result, 
people holding higher status are often accompanied by higher power. 
While the levels of power and status typically align, there are instances where 
the two constructs are imbalanced. An example is the current labor market where the 
amounts of power and status vary depending on occupation. For instance, a musician 
is viewed as highly respected (i.e., high status) but powerless, whereas a prison guard 
is considered to be powerful but endowed with relatively low status (Fragale, Overbeck, 
and Neale 2011; Rogalin, Soboroff, and Lovaglia 2007). It is likely that a musician’s 
chief talent does not involve managing resources and that a prison guard does not exert 
power for a purpose that the society regards as respectable. 
Despite these few conceivable exceptions, power and status are highly 
correlated with each other. While basic questions persist in the differentiated 
mechanisms surrounding power and status, it is important to investigate both elements 
in one setting. By examining one construct while controlling for the other, our 
investigation will be able to limit the interaction while manipulating the levels of power 
and status ascribed to observation targets. 
 
Section 4 Moral Expectation 
Morality refers to a set of values governing individual behavior as well as a 
comprehension of what is right and wrong. Specifically, moral values offer guidance 
on decision-making processes at the individual level and a script for social interactions. 
Morality communicates the types of experience, intention, conduct, and relationship 





While the definition of morality varies by culture and context, being just and 
caring appears to be a common foundation of human interaction (Haidt 2012; Hauser 
2006). The principle of care praises kindness and condemns harmful acts, and the 
principle of justice promotes cooperation, impartiality, and a creation of social 
consensus (Haidt 2012; Hegtvedt and Scheuerman 2010). An example of the principle 
of care would be tending to the needs of rather than hurting children and the elderly. In 
addition, an example concerning the principle of justice is advocating for equal 
opportunities for humans to thrive. 
When these moral values are exemplified as individual characteristics, a moral 
person is considered to be honest, helpful, generous, fair, compassionate, and selfless 
(Aquino and Reed 2002; Stets and Carter 2012). Others would also expect this person 
to demonstrate these moral traits in conduct. Therefore, individuals would develop 
higher levels of moral expectations about those whom they believe to think and act in 
a moral manner. 
 
Moral Expectation for Power 
Previous investigations have established a connection between morality and 
power with respect to primed psychological state and conduct. Specifically, research 
documents that a mindset of having power tends to make people act in a selfish and 
greedy manner, pay less attention on the concerns of others, and treat others as a means 
to an end of their own interests (Anderson and Berdahl 2002; Fiske 1993; Galinsky et 
al. 2006; Gruenfeld et al. 2008; Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson 2003). In relation to 





cheating, stealing, and moral hypocrisy (Boles, Croson, and Murnighan 2000; 
Lammers and Stapel 2009; Lammers, Stapel, and Galinsky 2010; Yap et al. 2013). 
Accordingly, feeling powerful encourages behavior that is unlikely intended to 
promote social well-being. 
Regarding the evaluation of power use, individuals subject to power may 
develop negative moral evaluations against those who wield power. Depending on the 
feature of exchange, people occupying lower-power positions in exchange networks 
are likely to perceive their more advantaged partners as unfair (Molm, Peterson, and 
Takahashi 2003). It is partly because certain contextual features highlight self-serving 
motives for exerting power, intensifying conflicts between parties at various positions 
of the network. 
Furthermore, simply observing the utilization of power could lead to similar 
attributions. Willer et al. (2005) asked participants to observe and assess negotiations 
in different types of exchange activities. The authors found that high-power individuals 
were viewed as selfish and greedy when their structural advantages were more 
pronounced as well as when unnecessarily utilizing power to exclude others from the 
exchange. In a follow-up study where participants also observed negotiations, high-
power individuals again were rated as more selfish and greedy as well as less 
cooperative and generous than their low-power counterparts (Willer et al. 2012). 
Moreover, the effect of power use on perceived selfishness was especially prominent 
when high-power individuals reaped maximal levels of profits during the exchange. 
This series of investigations offer two developing conclusions. First, observers may 





Further, they would consider it to be less moral to exploit such power for excessive 
gains at the expense of others. 
Research has so far examined the moral evaluation of behavior in which 
participants inferred immorality after observing abuses of power. However, less is 
known regarding how observers expect powerful individuals to behave. That is, prior 
to viewing any action, do people expect those with greater power to act immorally? 
Furthermore, given the potential association between lower morality and higher power, 
it is still unclear whether persons who have the least amount of power are expected to 
act relatively morally. In other words, instead of simply being a target of comparison 
for higher power, whether or not owning a level of power lower than the medium level 
has an effect on moral expectations. Research indicates that feeling low power may be 
correlated with the capability to empathize with others who share similar experiences 
(van Kleef et al. 2008). As a result, compared to those with equal power to reference 
targets, low-power individuals could receive a boost with respect to moral expectations 
as they lack the ability to abuse power and tend to put themselves in the places of others. 
If utilizing power produces negative moral perceptions, it is possible that, prior 
to interactions, observers develop low moral expectations about powerful individuals 
who are capable of exploiting power at the cost of others. Additionally, having the least 
amount of power may have a neutral or positive effect on moral expectations. 
 
Moral Expectation for Status 
Research has laid out much of the groundwork for linking morality to status. 





attainment process (Bai 2016). As discussed earlier, status reflects the perceived value 
of individual contributions to groups, which involves realizing beliefs of competence. 
By taking action to demonstrate one’s competence, others would consider the action to 
be prosocial given that it advances the agenda of the group. Further, when high-status 
individuals do respond to expectations that they should contribute more, their actions 
would be viewed as much more beneficial to the collective goal. After all, highly 
competent persons without opportunities to take any action would not be able to exert 
influence in the first place. 
A reinforced moral attribute surrounding the status order is also found in 
empirical studies. Specifically, demonstrating selflessness, generosity, commitment, or 
group-oriented motivations helps individuals gain status (Anderson and Kilduff 2009; 
Bai 2016; Ridgeway 1982); the status reward then encourages further contribution to 
advancing the well-being of others (Restivo and van de Rijt 2012; Simpson et al. 2012; 
Willer 2009). Moreover, real-life examples would be how the society awards status to 
individuals who display exemplary conduct. For instance, the purpose of bestowing 
service awards is to honor not so much the sheer quantity or quality of the services as 
the compassion and benevolent motives. 
Regarding responses of those with a low status, negative evaluations and 
sentiments against high-status persons are likely to be reduced. Being voluntarily 
followed by others, high-status individuals rely on influence instead of reward or 
coercion to change both the attitude and behavior of others (Rashotte and Webster, 
Murray 2005). Therefore, people tend to believe that those of higher status are acting 





status individuals, depending on the severity of the incident, people may dismiss it 
without further consideration. 
A series of studies in both the workplace and group exchange games found that 
individuals who consistently offered favors and accommodated the needs of others 
were both conferred high status as well as viewed as generous and helpful (Flynn 2003; 
Flynn et al. 2006). Results from additional laboratory experiments demonstrate that 
when group tasks allowed for the exploitation of partners, participants were more likely 
to cooperate with higher-status partners compared to lower-status partners, suggesting 
that higher-status persons are expected to act fairly (Willer 2009). In a sense, 
individuals tend to not only give status to those who act morally but also expect them 
to consistently behave in a moral manner. 
Despite remarkable insight into the relationship between higher status and 
moral expectations, a comparable focus has not yet been placed on how individuals 
perceive persons with the least amount of status. Logically, having a lower status would 
lead to moral expectations lower than the expectations resulting from a higher status. 
However, it is unclear whether or not a lower than medium level of status affects moral 
expectations. Potentially, moral expectations may not differ between individuals with 
low status and those with equal status to reference targets. On the other hand, it is 
plausible that observers expect persons who have the lowest level of status to act 
immorally as it may be the primary reason leading to their low status attribution. 
 To conclude, both the program of expectation states theory and empirical 





other hand, it remains uncertain that having the least amount of status has a neutral or 
negative effect on moral expectations. 
 
Comparing Effects of Power and Status on Moral Expectation 
In summary, the literature indicates that potentially higher power is associated 
with lower levels of moral expectations and that higher status is associated with higher 
levels of moral expectations. However, less clear is how they interact to affect such 
expectations given that power and status are highly correlated with each other and 
appear to produce countering effects. In other words, when both effects are in place, 
which of these two constructs would affect moral expectations to a greater extent? 
When various amounts of power and status are broken down by both high and 
low levels, it is plausible that observers expect individuals having high power with low 
status to be the least moral. While higher power is associated with lower morality, this 
negative effect would probably not be compensated by the addition of a low status. 
Additionally, those having high status with low power may be expected to act the most 
morally. Logically, while higher status often correlates with higher morality, this 
positive effect is not likely to be negated by adding a low power. 
Following the argument above, an important question arises in terms of 
comparisons between high power with high status and low power with low status: is 
power or status more predictive of moral expectations. Studies on moral action suggest 
a stronger effect of power compared to status with respect to encouraging selfish, unfair, 
and demeaning behavior (Blader and Chen 2012; Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky 2015; 






Conversely, experiments on positive impressions indicate that, relative to 
power, status carries greater weight in shaping the moral expectations of others. 
Specifically, Fragale et al. (2011) found that, when asked to evaluate observation 
targets at varied power and status positions, participants viewed high-status individuals 
as cordial, cooperative, and agreeable, regardless of power level. In addition, when 
asked to imagine hypothetical interactions, participants expected partners with high 
power and high status to behave appropriately as well as to accommodate and prioritize 
the needs of others. Taken together, despite their ability to abuse power, persons with 
both high power and high status are potentially perceived as moral as those with low 
power and high status. 
Indeed, high-power persons do not necessarily take corrupt action (DeCelles et 
al. 2012; Rus, van Knippenberg, and Wisse 2012). Power is attached to positions and 
serves as a means to ends, and therefore does not directly speak about one’s moral 
character. Even with tremendous power, individuals can exercise power with 
reasonable and moral constraint. By contrast, status is implied as a robust reference to 
morality because status can derive from moral attributes (Bai 2016). Moreover, status 
is accorded to individuals who contribute to the well-being of others, as a display of 
care and justice. Therefore, more than power, status appears to be a stronger predictor 





Chapter 3: Reactions to Moral Violations by Power and Status 
 Drawing from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, I propose that moral 
expectations will be: (1) negatively associated with power, and (2) positively associated 
with status. These proposed associations will be used to develop my arguments and 
hypotheses regarding how observers judge and punish moral violations committed by 
individuals with variable amounts of power and status. 
 
Section 1 Witnessing Immorality 
Witnessing moral violations triggers a broad range of responses from observers. 
They may experience moral rage (i.e., mixed feelings of anger and disgust) as well as 
the desire to compensate victims and punish violators (Kay, Jost, and Young 2005; 
Leliveld, Vandijk, and Vanbeest 2012; Skarlicki and Kulik 2004). By penalizing 
individuals who break moral codes, observers affirm both their moral identity and 
communal values, reduce disturbed feelings for the self, and prevent future violations 
(Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Stets and Carter 2012). In a sense, these punitive actions 
are imperative for the restoration of a morally balanced social world. 
 With respect to witnessing and addressing immoral incidents, research finds a 
variety of factors in influencing an observer’s emotional and behavioral reactions. First, 
having resources to guard against retaliation from violators or sharing a social identity 
with victims often motivates observers to intervene and redress suffering (Hegtvedt and 
Scheuerman 2010). The whistle-blower protection for reporting abuses is an example. 





severe and repulsive nature 1  of violations (Cushman, Young, and Hauser 2006). 
Moreover, if observers attribute the immoral behavior to a deliberate intent, they are 
likely to experience outrage and favor severe sanctions for the violator (Darley and 
Pittman 2003). An example would be the public outcry over cases of data breaches by 
service-providers where they knowingly share confidential information with 
unauthorized or untrusted third parties. Conversely, a sense of affiliation with a violator 
reduces the likelihood of moral concerns (Tarrant et al. 2012). For instance, people tend 
to side with those they know or trust in moral disputes. As a result, in the investigation 
of judgment and sanctions made by observers, perceptions of and relationships with 
moral violators are critical in predicting the behavioral outcomes for observers. 
 Several studies have examined how a violator’s power and status attributes may 
shape an observer’s reaction to witnessed immoral behavior. However, when observing 
individuals at varied positions of power and status, the factors influencing the 
development of expectations and perceptions regarding moral behavior are less known. 
As a result of this knowledge gap, several important questions arise: (1) prior to 
violations, do observers expect violators with varied power and status levels to act 
differently in terms of moral manners? (2) To what extent do these expectations affect 
observers’ attitude and behavior in response to the violations? In an attempt to address 
these questions, this dissertation examines the intersection of power, status, and moral 
expectations in shaping the moral judgment and punishment decisions of observers. 
                                                
1  I expect that uncertainty and responsibility will affect moral judgment because while 
ambiguity leaves room for interpretation, an outright violation appears purposeful. However, 
because the scope of ambiguity effect is beyond the capacities of the present research, I will 





Violators with Power 
Consistent expectations and perceptions can reinforce biased assumptions. 
Individuals tend to adopt essentialist views when a bias is confirmed and otherwise 
attribute to contingent factors when the bias is disconfirmed (Allport 1979; Jackson, 
Sullivan, and Hodge 1993). Such causal attribution process is likely to result from part 
of the mental efforts to avert cognitive dissonance by managing congruent ideas and 
values (Festinger 1957). For instance, a comment of “running in the family” refers to 
an internal cause. On the other hand, people are likely to treat evidence contrary to a 
particular issue they support or oppose as “exception.” Therefore, with respect to 
explaining human behavior, individuals are inclined to seek and interpret information 
that upholds preexisting beliefs. 
In the case of immoral behavior, observers are likely to conclude that the 
violator is prone to misdeeds as anticipated if they are already biased against the 
violator. On the other hand, observers would attribute to contextual factors if they do 
not expect such wrongdoings of the violator. Once observers ascribe the conduct to the 
violator’s moral character, they become less likely to perceive the behavior as 
accidental and more likely to enact punitive measures following the violation (Darley 
and Pittman 2003). For example, a habitual offender may face elevated legal charges 
relative to a first-time offender when the recidivism is seen as a predictor of future 
offenses. 
The prediction of moral expectations for power developed in Chapter 2 states 
that observers will expect higher-power individuals to act less morally compared to 





violators relative to low-power violators, observers are thus more likely to associate the 
wrongdoing with a propensity for immorality as a result of confirmed biases against 
those holding greater power. Observers would further conclude that the immoral 
conduct showcases the true character of high-power violators. Considering the 
violation to be intentional, observers may then prescribe harsher judgment and stronger 
punishment for these high-power violators compared to low-power violators. 
As a result, I propose that with lower levels of moral expectations about higher-
power individuals, observers will respond with both harsh judgment and punishment 
when these powerful individuals act immorally. Comparatively, observers will react 
leniently to the misconduct of lower-power individuals. 
 
Violators with Status 
 As opposed to violators of power, responses of observers to violators who 
occupy different status positions are rather challenging to predict. Recall that in Chapter 
2, I hypothesize that observers will expect higher-status persons relative to lower-status 
persons to behave in a moral manner. Accordingly, given the mechanism of 
psychological consistency, observers may seek contextual reasons to reconcile 
disconfirmed beliefs for high-status persons who commit moral violations. 
Additionally, the immoral conduct may not be perceived as inappropriate unless 
justifications for the behavior are clearly invalid (Massey, Freeman, and Zelditch 1997). 






Indeed, violators may be sanctioned for counter-normative behavior, and there 
is no exception for those with high status. In a theoretical discussion, Giordano (1983) 
argues that observers would punish high-status individuals for misconduct; the greater 
the extent to which these high-status individuals fail to fulfill expectations, the more 
likely they would be to receive punishment. A series of experiments demonstrated that 
observers placed differential judgment between high-status and low-status violators for 
deviating from their respective moral expectations depending on situational context 
(Niedermeier, Horowitz, and Kerr 2001). Specifically, the researchers found that high-
status physicians were rated guiltier than their low-status counterparts when they 
expressed remorse after an ethical breach, whereas results were reversed when no 
remorse was shown. Logically, the remorseful act potentially undermines the expected 
capabilities of high status but is compatible with that of a low status ranking. 
Additional studies revealed the importance of situations where the violation 
contradicts beliefs of competence in the violators held by observers (Shaw and 
Skolnick 1996; Skolnick and Shaw 1994). To be precise, when a violator is regarded 
as highly competent in a profession, professional misconduct may draw stronger 
criticisms and penalties for the violator compared to wrongdoings in a non-professional 
setting. It could be due to that observers consider the high-status violator to be 
exploiting conferred influence. For example, the use of drugs may seem less excusable 
for an athlete in competitive sports than in regular social gatherings. Furthermore, the 
doping scandal would appear unforgivable if an all-star athlete instead of a mediocre 





not concern perceived competence, a high-status violator would potentially be 
punished less harshly relative to a low-status violator. 
 Regarding perceived immorality toward violations, observers are likely to see 
the misconduct of high-status individuals as a breach of trust, with the developed 
feelings of betrayal resulting in harsh judgment (Giordano 1983; Wahrman 1970). 
Compared to low-status violators, observers may find the conduct of high-status 
violators less acceptable because they conferred respect to those with high status but 
experienced greater discrepancies between perceptions and expectations. As a result, 
observers could experience conflicting emotions when deciding how to deal with high-
status violators whose behavior runs counter to their expectations. 
Researchers have argued that, however, due to the high social standing of high-
status violators, as long as the moral violation does not appear hypocritical, poorly 
justified, or firmly tied to negative intentions, observers’ sentiments may not 
successfully translate into severe penalties (Effron and Monin 2010; Giordano 1983; 
Massey et al. 1997). Observers could defend their moral expectations by disassociating 
the misconduct from the moral character of violators. Indeed, high-status individuals 
are able to retain influence if the deviation is viewed as an isolated incident (Wagner 
1988). Given judgment about the wrongdoing, observers would not necessarily 
consider the act to be reflective of violators’ nature. Therefore, sanctions to high-status 
violators may not be warranted. Altogether, I predict that observers will view the 
behavior of higher-status violators as more immoral but favor weaker punishment 





Section 2 Fears of Retaliation 
The decision to sanction is a function of social, psychological, and normative 
factors. When the decision incurs a high risk for the self, observers tend to opt for a 
less costly approach and modify their sanctioning behavior. Even if observers are 
motivated to punish, they may not choose to accept the personal cost of prescribing 
said punishment. It is understandable when there is a lack of protective measures for 
potential negative consequences. For instance, some witnesses may decide not to 
inform authorities of criminal operations or testify in trials for fears of retaliation from 
perpetrators because simply coming forward means exposing themselves to the 
perpetrators. 
The retaliatory practices by those who receive unwanted treatment in the first 
place are found to be effective in blocking further undesirable outcomes. In group 
exchange games, participants who employed defection and exclusion strategies to non-
cooperative members saw an increase in subsequent reciprocation from these members 
(Feinberg, Willer, and Schultz 2014; Lomborg 1996). Such actions signal both a 
motivation and a capability for revenge to alter the behavior of others in a desirable 
manner. 
Several studies examining mistreatment in the workplace offer significant 
insight into hierarchy and reprisal methods. Specifically, employees are likely to fall 
victim to retaliation when the violator has greater power over them, such as a senior 
employee or a supervisor (Aquino, Tripp, and Bies 2001; Cortina and Magley 2003). 
It is conceivable that higher-power violators relative to those holding lower power are 





Undoubtedly, the decision of whether or not to report a violation is considerably 
impacted by career and personal risks (Peirce, Rosen, and Hiller 1997). For instance, 
employees could risk demotions or even dismissal from jobs for disclosing violations 
committed by supervisors. In summary, compared to their lower-ranking counterparts, 
individuals of higher standing have a greater access to imposing retributions and are 
more likely to be able to avoid punishments. 
Conversely, with anonymity and other protections, observers of perceived 
injustice were prepared to sanction violators (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). The 
protective measures helped observers of moral violations reduce negative 
consequences for exposing the violators. As described previously, higher-power and 
higher-status persons typically have greater retaliatory capabilities than those with 
lower standing. To avenge or deter further unfavorable outcomes, these high 
power/status violators may exercise power and influence to identify hostility and 
respond with threats and deterrents. Considering their relative levels of power and 
status to violators, observers would then have to weigh concerns of reprisal when 
making punishment decisions. Therefore, as opposed to the predictions stated earlier in 
this chapter, due to risks of retaliation from violators, observers may choose not to 
punish higher-power violators harshly compared to lower-power violators. 
In short, in situations where violators can retaliate, it is plausible that observers 
of moral violations will favor weaker punishment for higher-power and higher-status 
violators relative to those holding lower power and lower status respectively. By 
contrast, when observers are protected from retributions, harsher punishment may be 





Chapter 4: Predictions 
Based on the theoretical and empirical discussions outlined in the preceding 
chapters, I present predictions below describing the proposed effects of power and 
status on moral expectations and reactions to moral violations. 
 Several positive traits including honesty, generosity, helpfulness, fairness, and 
selflessness are considered to be essential to a person’s moral character (Aquino and 
Reed 2002; Stets and Carter 2012). Experimental studies demonstrate that observers 
tend to characterize the use of power to obtain substantial resources as selfish and 
greedy (Willer et al. 2012, 2005). I propose that these negative perceptions of power 
abuse will help generate lower moral expectations about powerful individuals. 
Although individuals of power may wield it with constraint, observers recognize that 
those in places of power are capable of achieving their desired goal, even if it goes 
against the interest of others. As a result, prior to viewing an action, observers would 
expect higher-power individuals to act less morally relative to lower-power individuals. 
Hypothesis 1: Observers will have lower levels of moral expectations about 
evaluation targets holding higher power compared to those holding lower power. 
 
Conversely, a positive relationship is evident between morality and high status. 
Status can be conferred on the basis of perceived prosociality. Indeed, research has 
shown that high-status persons were viewed as generous and helpful, and were 
expected to act fairly compared to those with low status (Flynn 2003; Flynn et al. 2006; 
Willer 2009). Therefore, I predict that observers will anticipate higher-status 





Hypothesis 2: Observers will have higher levels of moral expectations about 
evaluation targets with higher status compared to those with lower status. 
 
Multiple studies report that the power effect tends to overtake the status effect, 
with individuals at high levels of both power and status positions predicted to act 
selfishly, unfairly, and dishonorably (Blader and Chen 2012; Dubois et al. 2015; Fast 
et al. 2012). In other words, individuals with high power and high status are equally 
likely to exhibit corrupt behavior as compared with individuals with high power and 
low status. On the other hand, status appears to be a more pronounced factor in 
developing positive impressions about target persons, such as perceived agreeableness 
and tendency to prioritize the needs of others (Fragale et al. 2011). More specifically, 
an individual with high power and high status is likely to be viewed as moral as those 
with low power and high status. 
I argue that a significant moral component more closely aligns with the status 
as opposed to the power attainment process. Power describes an ability derived from 
the control over resources which would not necessarily lead to corrupt behavior 
(DeCelles et al. 2012; Rus et al. 2012). By contrast, status is accorded to individuals 
who are perceived to have greatly contributed to the well-being of others. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that status will be a stronger predictor of moral expectations compared to 
power. 
Hypothesis 3: In the development of moral expectations about evaluation 
targets, observers will base their expectations more on the status than the power 





When observers attribute witnessed immoral behavior to a deliberate intention 
compared to an accident, they are more likely to experience outrage and favor severe 
sanctions (Darley and Pittman 2003). If Hypothesis 1 concerning the association of 
higher power with lower moral expectations were supported, one would anticipate that 
observers would conclude that moral violators holding high power are prone to 
misdeeds. Moreover, if these powerful individuals are perceived to have intentionally 
abused power and broken moral codes, the observers would then experience strong 
negative emotions and punish harshly (Folger and Skarlicki 2004). As a result, with the 
expectation of lower morality attributed to higher-power individuals, I predict that 
observers of moral violations will respond more harshly to higher-power violators than 
to lower-power violators. 
Hypothesis 4A: When witnessing moral violations committed by higher-power 
individuals, observers will view the violation as more immoral and favor 
stronger punishment compared to lower-power individuals. 
 
Comparing violations committed by lower-status individuals, observers may 
view the immoral conduct of higher-status individuals as less acceptable because it 
displays a greater deviation from the expected moral behavior. As a result, feelings of 
betrayal could develop toward higher-status offenders, with observers considering the 
offense to be a violation of not only morality but trust (Giordano 1983; Wahrman 1970). 
However, severe sanctions may not be guaranteed for higher-status violators if the 
wrongdoing does not directly stand at odds with the perceived competence of societal 





if the deviant behavior is seen as separate from the moral qualities of the violators. 
Therefore, following the contending arguments, I predict that observers of moral 
violations will judge higher-status violators more strictly but punish them less severely 
relative to lower-status violators. 
Hypothesis 4B: When witnessing moral violations committed by higher-status 
individuals, observers will view the violation as more immoral but favor weaker 
punishment compared to lower-status individuals. 
 
The decision to punish violations is a function of social, psychological, and 
normative factors. In costly situations, for example, observers tend to modify their 
sanctioning behavior. For instance, strong reactions from observers may be deterred if 
the violator retains the capacity to retaliate (Hegtvedt and Scheuerman 2010; Skarlicki 
and Kulik 2004). Furthermore, compared to their lower-ranking counterparts, higher-
power and higher-status persons have an advantage in accessing both material and 
intangible resources in order to prevent and avoid unwanted treatment. For these 
violators, the resources at their disposal can be utilized to instill a tremendous fear of 
reprisal in a potential observer, leading to a reduction in punishment severity proposed 
by the observer. For observers, having greater power and influence relative to the 
violators may help mitigate potential fears and actualize deserved penalties. 
Therefore, to add to and further clarify Hypothesis 4A, I predict that considering 
risks of retaliation, observers will be discouraged from harshly punishing higher-power 





such concerns would not affect higher-status violators much because they will have 
already been punished less severely than their lower-status counterparts. 
Hypothesis 5: Compared to lower-power violators, observers of moral 
violations will favor weaker punishment for higher-power violators who 






Chapter 5: Study 1 
I designed the study to test Hypotheses 1 - 4B, predicting the effects of power 
and status on both moral expectations and responses to observed moral violations. 
Participants were recruited from an online crowdsourcing platform that is increasingly 
used by social scientists known as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk has an 
estimated 500,000 registered users worldwide, with the United States accounting for 
70 percent of user share (Ipeirotis 2010). While individual users may come and go, at 
any given time researchers have access to an average pool of 7,300 MTurk respondents 
(Stewart et al. 2015). Demographically, although MTurk users tend to be female and 
liberal, as well as younger and more educated than the general population of the U.S., 
they are fairly representative of the domestic online community (Berinsky, Huber, and 
Lenz 2012; Paolacci and Chandler 2014). 
I conducted a pretest for Study 1 on MTurk, and the results suggested that both 
the power and status conditions be revised. These revisions were incorporated into the 
final protocol detailed below. 
 
Section 1 Methods 
General Design and Conditions 
I adopted a web-based vignette methodology where participants read 
descriptions of hypothetical situations, evaluated the situations as well as the parties 
involved, and then responded to a series of questions. In the first part of the hypothetical 





status compared to peers or participants. Specifically, I utilized an organizational 
structure of a workplace in order to manipulate the relative levels of power and status. 
In the second part of the scenario, I provided details of a moral violation committed by 
the evaluation target where the target person hit a parked car and then left the scene. 
This study design addresses two contexts concerning power and status 
relationships, with participants always assigned as evaluators. The first context 
accounts for relative levels of power and status between the evaluation target and the 
evaluator (referred to as “relative context”), where the respective positions and 
disparities between them are identified by the evaluator. An example of this would be 
a student (evaluator) contrasting their relative power level against that of a teacher 
(evaluation target) in the classroom setting. The second context excludes comparison 
between the evaluator and the target but instead focuses on the evaluator observing the 
target’s position relative to peers (referred to as “observed context”). An appropriate 
example is asking a student (evaluator) to compare the relative power levels between 
multiple teachers (evaluation targets). 
Compared to the design described in the original proposal revision, I made the 
decision to distinguish these two contexts with respect to data collection for the 
following two reasons. First, in the relative context where participants contrast their 
positions with that of the targets, participants’ self-evaluation may confound studied 
effects. For instance, the initial assignment of low-status positions in experiments led 
to negative sentiments on the part of the participants (Lovaglia and Houser 1996). 
Moreover, preferences for similar others could lead participants to develop favorable 





participants. Second, findings from the pretest (results not shown) were consistent with 
the aforementioned concerns, suggesting confounding effects that varied by reference 
groups. 
In addition to the two types of reference contexts, I adopted a three (higher, 
equal, and lower power) by three (higher, equal, and lower status2) design to manipulate 
different levels of power and status. Following the integration of these experimental 




MTurk users who were 18 years of age or older and living in the U.S. at the 
time of recruitment were invited to participate in the study. After enrolling on the 
MTurk website, participants were guided to Qualtrics.com to complete the study survey. 
At the beginning of the study, participants were randomly assigned to receive one of 
the 18 vignettes. The vignettes detailed workplace scenarios that illustrated power and 
status differences either between the participant and a colleague (nine vignettes) or 
between a separate individual and his colleagues (nine vignettes). As discussed 
previously, the first type of scenario served to include a comparison between the 
evaluation target and the evaluator, with the second providing an observation of the 
target’s position relative to workplace peers independent from the evaluator. These 
vignettes illustrated distinct levels of power witnessed in (1) organizational ranks, (2) 
                                                
2 The three levels of power/status categories refer to the evaluation target having higher, equal, 





control over decisions, and (3) ability to overcome disagreement. Variable amounts of 
status differed in the portrayal of (1) conferred respect, (2) value of contributions, and 
(3) influence over others. Appendix A displays descriptions of the scenarios presented 
to participants. 
After reading the workplace scenario, participants assessed moral expectations 
about the evaluation target. Participants then proceeded to read a passage describing 
that the target person hit a parked car while driving in a parking garage (see Appendix 
A). Specifically, the vignette illustrated that the incident caused some minor damage to 
the parked car without injury, and the target person left right away without checking. 
After learning about the incident, participants reported their emotional reactions and 
attitudes toward the behavior, the attribution process, and the preferred punishment for 
the target. Finally, participants answered questions regarding demographic information 
and manipulation checks that assessed the perceived levels of power and status toward 
the target. Upon completing the survey, participants were debriefed and paid $1 as 
compensation for participation. Average study completion time was 10 minutes. 
 
Dependent Measures 
 Expectations of Morality. I measured moral expectations using an index of 14 
pairs of characteristics describing the evaluation target. In addition to items from Stets 
and Carter's (2012) moral identity measure, I included evaluations of both empathy and 
trustworthiness. Paired items were displayed in a randomized order. Participants 
responded to the assessment on an eight-point bipolar scale. Results were averaged and 





expectations. Details of this question and index are located in Appendix A. The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for the moral expectation index is 0.97. 
Moral Judgment. I measured moral judgment utilizing an index of three 
statements that assessed participants’ view of the target’s behavior. Participants 
responded to the statements, “Jerry’s behavior was [problematic/excusable/moral] …” 
on an eight-point scale with 1 representing strongly disagree and 8 indicating strongly 
agree. The statements were presented in a random order. Results were averaged and 
axes aligned so that a higher index rating reveals harsher judgment. The Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient of reliability for the moral judgment index is 0.65. 
Punishment. I measured punishment utilizing an index of four questions that 
queried participants regarding sanctioning options. Participants indicated their support 
on an eight-point scale for each of the following randomly ordered choices: (1) “Jerry 
should pay for the car repairs.”; (2) “Legal action should be taken against Jerry.”; (3) 
“Jerry deserves to be fired from job.”; and (4) “Jerry deserves to be socially excluded.” 
Scores on the scale range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 8 (strongly agree), with results 
averaged for analysis. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for the 
punishment index is 0.61. 
In addition to the variables pertinent to hypothesis testing, I considered 
emotional and perceptual responses as supplementary to the moral decision-making 
process, and therefore included the following measures in the questionnaire. When 
witnessing moral violations, observers are likely to experience sentiments in accord 
with how they perceive the immoral conduct of violators. Furthermore, both 





the confirmed and disconfirmed biases against violators’ moral character. Regarding 
the tendency to report moral violations, it implies a potentially costlier action for 
observers to take compared to choosing the preferred punishment. 
Negative Emotion. Negative emotion was measured by an index of eight paired 
characteristics. Participants were asked to report the intensity of their feelings upon 
learning about the immoral incident. On a 10-point bipolar scale, participants evaluated 
each of the following choices in a random order: Happy/Unhappy; 
Satisfied/Dissatisfied; Not angry/Angry; Fearful/Not fearful; Not anxious/Anxious; 
Guilty/Not guilty; Disappointed/Not disappointed; and Not frustrated/Frustrated (Haidt 
2003; Lovaglia and Houser 1996; Turner and Stets 2006). I averaged and recoded 
results so that greater numbers on the index indicate stronger negative sentiments. The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for the negative emotion index is 0.78. 
 Purposeful Intent. The perceived intention of the target’s behavior was 
measured with an evaluation statement: “Jerry did not do it on purpose.” Participants 
expressed the extent of their agreement with the statement using an eight-point scale, 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 8 (strongly agree). I reversely coded results so 
that greater numbers on this measure indicate perceptions of a more deliberate intent. 
 Perceived Hypocrisy. Perception of the target as a hypocrite was measured with 
an evaluation statement: “I find Jerry to be a hypocrite.” Participants expressed the 
extent of their agreement with the statement on an eight-point scale, ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 8 (strongly agree). 
 Reporting Behavior. I measured the tendency to report with a question that 





Participants in the “relative power/status context” received the statement, “I will inform 
the owner of the damaged car by leaving an anonymous note.” Those in the “observed 
context” instead received the statement, “If I were there, I would inform the owner of 
the damaged car.” Participants expressed the extent of their agreement with the 
statement on an eight-point scale, with potential scores ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 8 (strongly agree). 
 
Rationales behind The Experimental Approach 
 I adopted an experimental design in Study 1 to test my hypotheses for multiple 
reasons. First, the method allows me to apply precise and clear manipulations of power 
and status. Given the strong correlation between power and status, when investigating 
both constructs, it is imperative to be able to manage one construct and control for the 
other. Additionally, the experimental conditions for various levels of power and status 
can be tailored to the overall study design while maintaining the validity of indicators. 
 Second, experimental research helps create conditions not readily found in 
natural settings. Moral violations can be too broad to narrow down to specific behaviors, 
and witnessing particular misconduct may not be a common experience in real life. As 
a result, the context, behavior, and relationship peculiar to moral violations can be 
properly represented and examined in experiments. 
 Third, the controlled environment and random assignment are appropriate for 
causal analysis. Considering many factors that drive how observers of moral violations 





violators. Therefore, it is necessary to control for confounding factors and separate the 
effects of power and status of violators on the responses of observers. 
Finally, the characteristic that experiments are replicable facilitates further 
checks and verification of study results. With the aim of rigorous research, I attempted 
to replicate the results of Study 1 in Study 2. 
Section 2 Results 
Participants 
A total of 553 participants completed the study. Of these, 100 participants did 
not pass manipulation check items (e.g., misidentifying power or status characteristic 
of the target person), and six participants did not answer correctly to the attention check 
question. I removed these cases rendering a rejection rate of 18.6%. Supplemental 
analyses which included rejected data (i.e., all enrolled participants) demonstrated 
results similar to those from the primary analysis population reported in the following 
section. In addition, I identified no systematic differences in the collected demographic 
information between participants included and excluded from analyses. After rejections, 
450 participants were included in the primary analysis population, with 25 participants 
in each condition. 
With respect to the primary analysis population, 56% of participants were male, 
and 44% were female, with a total mean age of 36 years. In terms of race and ethnicity, 
78% of participants self-identified as non-Hispanic White, 7% reported non-Hispanic 
Black, 6% listed Asian, 7% self-identified as Hispanic, 1% reported Native American, 





the following: 1% of participants had not completed high school education; 15% of 
participants reported high schools to be their highest educational attainment; 38% listed 
some college; another 38% listed a bachelor’s degree; and 9% held advanced or 
professional degrees. When asked to compare their socioeconomic standing with others 
in the U.S. (subjective SES) on a scale of one to ten, 13% of participants selected a 
number between one and four, while 37% responded with five or six and the remaining 



















 In this section, I present results pooled across both relative and observed 
contexts. Respective analyses on the two subsets of data each produced similar 
outcomes. Supplemental findings are reported in Appendix B. 
 I predict in Hypothesis 1 that observers will have lower moral expectations 
about evaluation targets holding higher power than those holding lower power. Figure 
5-1 shows the average scores of moral expectations for three different power ranks. 
The three columns from left to right each represents an evaluation target described as 
having lower, equal, or higher power compared to participants or peers in the vignettes. 
From the results, a clear trend can be discerned, where evaluation targets with greater 
power were consistently rated as less moral than those with a lower degree of power. 
 






















 After controlling for demographics of participants, an ANOVA test displayed 
in Table 5-1 confirms significant variations in expectation scores between the three 
power conditions (F = 4.84; p = .008). 
Table 5-1 ANOVA Test for Moral Expectation Index between Power Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 21 55.936 2.664 1.37 .125 
      
Power Conditions 2 18.766 9.383 4.84** .008 
      
   Gender 1 7.312 7.312 3.77† .052 
   Age 1 0.200 0.200 0.10 .748 
   Race 5 12.094 2.419 1.25 .285 
   Education 4 3.457 0.864 0.45 .775 
   Subjective SES 8 10.668 1.334 0.69 .702 
      
Residual 428 829.696 1.939   
      
R-squared 0.0632 
N 450 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
Three levels of power: lower, equal, and higher power. 
 
 
Table 5-2 further tests how and which levels of power differ from each other in 
expectation scores. It reveals that participants expected higher-power evaluation targets 
to be less moral than those with lower power (t = -3.09; two-tailed p = .006). Therefore, 
the results support my first hypothesis that observers’ moral expectations about an 





Table 5-2 T-Tests for Moral Expectation Index between Power Conditions 
  Tukey3  
 Contrast t p-value N 
     
Equal Power vs Lower Power -0.200 -1.22 .440 300 
 (0.164)    
Higher Power vs Lower Power -0.512 -3.09** .006 300 
 (0.166)    
Higher Power vs Equal Power -0.312 -1.89 .143 300 
 (0.165)    
     
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1; Two-tailed tests 










                                                
3 Tukey’s range test is appropriate for conducting multiple pairwise comparisons. It is based 





I predict in Hypothesis 2 that observers will have higher moral expectations 
about evaluation targets with higher status relative to those with lower status. Figure 5-
2 reveals the average moral expectation scores for evaluation targets occupying lower, 
equal, and higher-status positions relative to participants and peers. As seen in the 
figure, targets with higher status were consistently expected to exhibit higher morality 
than those in lower ranks. 
 




























Results from an ANOVA test in Table 5-3 indicate significant differences in 
moral expectations between the status conditions (F = 78.26; p < .001). 
Table 5-3 ANOVA Test for Moral Expectation Index between Status Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 21 264.361 12.589 8.67 .000 
      
Status Conditions 2 227.192 113.596 78.26*** .000 
      
   Gender 1 7.194 7.194 4.96* .026 
   Age 1 0.156 0.156 0.11 .742 
   Race 5 6.544 1.309 0.90 .479 
   Education 4 8.458 2.114 1.46 .214 
   Subjective SES 8 7.454 0.932 0.64 .742 
      
Residual 428 621.260 1.452   
      
R-squared 0.2985 
N 450 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 




Table 5-4 reports tests for differences in each pairwise comparison of the three 
conditions. The results show that, relative to lower-status targets, participants held 
greater moral expectations about both equal-status (t = 10.00; two-tailed p < .001) and 
higher-status (t = 11.55; two-tailed p < .001) evaluation targets. Taken together, the 
findings lend strong support to the second hypothesis that observers’ moral 





Table 5-4 T-Tests for Moral Expectation Index between Status Conditions 
  Tukey  
 Contrast t p-value N 
     
Equal Status vs Lower Status 1.419 10.00*** .000 300 
 (0.142)    
Higher Status vs Lower Status 1.637 11.55*** .000 300 
 (0.142)    
Higher Status vs Equal Status 0.219 1.55 .268 300 
 (0.141)    
     
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1; Two-tailed tests 




















I predict in Hypothesis 3 that when developing moral expectations about 
evaluation targets, observers will base their expectations more on the status than the 
power of the targets. Consistent with this hypothesis, two important observations were 
noted. First, comparing both Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, relative to power conditions, 
considerable variations in the expectation scores across status conditions suggest that 
status is a more influential factor. Second, when broken down by different levels of 
power and status, evaluation targets with both higher power and higher status received 
greater expectation scores compared to those with lower power and lower status (t = 
4.21; two-tailed p < .001). This observation suggests that the positive effects of higher 
status on moral expectations may act to offset any negative effects as a result of higher 
power. I conducted analyses to separately examine the statistical significance and 
strength of association for power and status effects. 
Table 5-5 tests the effects in moral expectations when accounting for both 
power and status. Controlling for participants’ demographic characteristics, 
expectation scores significantly varied by both power (F = 6.58; p = .001) and status 
levels (F = 80.24; p < .001).  However, the p-value for the status effect is smaller than 










Table 5-5 ANOVA Test for Moral Expectation Index across Power and Status Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 23 282.968 12.303 8.70 .000 
      
Power Conditions 2 18.606 9.303 6.58** .001 
Status Conditions 2 227.032 113.516 80.24*** .000 
      
   Gender 1 7.139 7.139 5.05* .025 
   Age 1 0.009 0.009 0.01 .935 
   Race 5 6.379 1.276 0.90 .479 
   Education 4 7.960 1.990 1.41 .230 
   Subjective SES 8 5.674 0.709 0.50 .855 
      
Residual 426 602.664 1.415   
      
R-squared 0.3195 
N 450 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
Three levels of power/status: lower, equal, and higher power/status. 
 
Table 5-6 further assesses the effect sizes of power and status levels. Results 
from the analysis indicate that the model accounts for approximately 28.3% of the 
variability in moral expectation index. While 0.02% of the explained variance was 
attributable to power conditions, the estimate reveals that status conditions accounted 
for 27% of the explained variation. In other words, more so than power, status strongly 







Table 5-6 Effect Sizes for Power and Status on Moral Expectation Index 
 df Omega-Squared4 95% Confidence Interval 
     
Model 23 .283 .171 to .315 
     
Power Conditions 2 .025 .000 to .061 
Status Conditions 2 .270 .200 to .334 
    
   Gender 1 .009 .000 to .038 
   Age 1 .000 .000 to .002 
   Race 5 .000 .000 to .013 
   Education 4 .004 .000 to .024 
   Subjective SES 8 .000 .000 to -.006 
    
Omega-Squared values for individual factors are partial. 
 
Therefore, the results support my third hypothesis that when developing moral 
expectations about an evaluation target, observers will rely more on the amount of 








                                                
4 An important characteristic of Omega-squared estimates is that they are less biased by small 





I predict in Hypothesis 4A that, compared to lower-power violators, observers 
of moral violations committed by higher-power violators will view the violation as 
more immoral and favor stronger punishment. Figure 5-3 displays the average 
judgment and punishment scores given by participants who evaluated violators with 
varying levels of power. Bars in light gray represent judgment outcomes, where greater 
values indicate greater perceived immorality. Further, bars in dark gray represent 
sanctioning preferences, where greater values indicate stronger penalties administered 
to the violator. 
 
Figure 5-3 Moral Judgment Index and Punishment Index by Violator’s Power Level 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
The ANOVA test shown in Table 5-7 reveals that participants did not judge 
differently between violators with variable amounts of power (F = 0.21; p = .810). 
However, the test in Table 5-8 identifies significant variations in severity of 




























Table 5-7 ANOVA Test for Moral Judgment Index between Power Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 21 21.468 1.022 1.06 .383 
      
Power Conditions 2 0.403 0.202 0.21 .810 
      
   Gender 1 3.568 3.568 3.72† .054 
   Age 1 0.067 0.067 0.07 .792 
   Race 5 6.857 1.371 1.43 .212 
   Education 4 1.933 0.483 0.50 .733 
   Subjective SES 8 8.238 1.030 1.07 .381 
      
Residual 428 410.852 0.960   
      
R-squared 0.0497 
N 450 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
 
Table 5-8 ANOVA Test for Moral Punishment Index between Power Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 21 59.596 2.838 1.96 .007 
      
Power Conditions 2 7.594 3.797 2.62† .074 
      
   Gender 1 10.893 10.893 7.50** .006 
   Age 1 0.511 0.511 0.35 .553 
   Race 5 11.151 2.230 1.54 .177 
   Education 4 26.372 6.593 4.54** .001 
   Subjective SES 8 17.513 2.189 1.51 .152 
      
Residual 428 621.284 1.452   
      
R-squared 0.0875 
N 450 






Accordingly, Table 5-9 examines whether differences in punishment scores 
were statistically significant between each pair of the power conditions. It reveals that 
participants proposed tougher sanctions for higher-power violators compared to lower 
power-violators (t = 2.28; two-tailed p = .060). 
Table 5-9 T-Tests for Moral Punishment Index between Power Conditions 
  Tukey  
 Contrast t p-value N 
     
Equal Power vs Lower Power 0.181 1.28 .410 300 
 (0.142)    
Higher Power vs Lower Power 0.327 2.28† .060 300 
 (0.143)    
Higher Power vs Equal Power 0.146 1.03 .561 300 
 (0.143)    
     
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1; Two-tailed tests 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Therefore, in partial support of Hypothesis 4A, results show that observers of 
moral violations punished higher-power violators more harshly relative to lower-power 
violators; however, observers did not view the behavior of higher-power violators as 











I predict in Hypothesis 4B that, relative to lower-status violators, observers of 
moral violations committed by higher-status violators will view the violation as more 
immoral but favor weaker punishment. Figure 5-4 illustrates the average judgment 
(light gray bars) and punishment (dark gray bars) scores for violators across the status 
ranks. For both judgment and punishment outcomes, greater values indicate more 
intense reactions. 
 
Figure 5-4 Moral Judgment Index and Punishment Index by Violator’s Status Level 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
ANOVA tests in Table 5-10 and Table 5-11 demonstrate that varied amounts 
of status did not affect moral judgment (F = 0.60; p = .549) but resulted in differential 




























Table 5-10 ANOVA Test for Moral Judgment Index between Status Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 21 22.213 1.058 1.10 .340 
      
Status Conditions 2 1.148 0.574 0.60 .549 
      
   Gender 1 3.513 3.513 3.67† .056 
   Age 1 0.090 0.090 0.09 .759 
   Race 5 6.514 1.303 1.36 .238 
   Education 4 1.802 0.451 0.47 .757 
   Subjective SES 8 8.516 1.065 1.11 .354 
      
Residual 428 410.107 0.958   
      
R-squared 0.0514 
N 450 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
 
Table 5-11 ANOVA Test for Moral Punishment Index between Status Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 21 65.632 3.125 2.17 .002 
      
Status Conditions 2 13.630 6.815 4.74** .009 
      
   Gender 1 10.768 10.768 7.49** .006 
   Age 1 0.672 0.672 0.47 .494 
   Race 5 8.399 1.680 1.17 .323 
   Education 4 25.927 6.482 4.51** .001 
   Subjective SES 8 17.062 2.133 1.48 .160 
      
Residual 428 615.248 1.437   
      
R-squared 0.0964 
N 450 





Table 5-12 reports tests for pairwise differences in punishment scores between 
the three status conditions. Results indicate that, compared to lower-status violators, 
participants preferred less severe punishment for both higher-status (t = -2.51; two-
tailed p = .033) and equal-status (t = -2.81; two-tailed p = .014) violators. 
Table 5-12 T-Tests for Moral Punishment Index between Status Conditions 
  Tukey  
 Contrast t p-value N 
     
Equal Status vs Lower Status -0.396 -2.81* .014 300 
 (0.141)    
Higher Status vs Lower Status -0.355 -2.51* .033 300 
 (0.141)    
Higher Status vs Equal Status 0.042 0.30 .952 300 
 (0.140)    
     
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1; Two-tailed tests 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
As a result, Hypothesis 4B receives only partial support: observers penalized 
higher-status violators less harshly relative to lower-status violators but did not view 










Results presented in this section represent data categorized by power and status 
levels, pooled across relative/observed experimental contexts. Supplemental analyses 
for the two subsets of relative and observed data are reported in Appendix B. 
Figure 5-5 highlights differences in moral expectation scores between four 
combinations of power and status levels out of nine possible combinations from the 
vignettes. A clear pattern shows that participants expected lower-power-and-higher-
status evaluation targets to act most morally, whereas they gave targets who held higher 
power and lower status the lowest moral expectation scores.5 Further ANOVA finds no 
interactions between power and status (F = 1.26; p = .284). 
 
Figure 5-5 Moral Expectation Index for the Intersections of Violator’s Power and Status at 
Both High and Low Levels (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
                                                
5  These two power/status categories also respectively represent the two conditions where 
participants gave the highest and lowest moral expectation scores to evaluation targets among 
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Given the logic behind my proposed theory and the results that power and status 
held by the violators predicted both moral expectations and punishment for the 
violators,6  I conducted mediation analysis to examine whether moral expectations 
mediate the effects of power and status on punishment (see Figure 5-6). 
I adopted Preacher and Hayes' (2004) bootstrapping approach that 
accommodates small-sized and non-normal data. I applied 5,000 resamples with 
replacement from the data set and used a percentile estimate of the confidence interval 
(α = .05). Control variables in the analysis included judgment, negative emotion, 
purposeful intent, perceived hypocrisy, and participants’ demographics. 
 
Figure 5-6 Mediation Model for Power, Status, Moral Expectation, and Moral Punishment 
 
Table 5-13 reveals a statistically significant mediator of moral expectation 
scores between power of violators and punishment for violators. A significant and 
negative coefficient for the relationship between power and moral expectation is 
consistent with the above findings that having greater power led to observers’ lower 
expectations. Additionally, the coefficient for the relationship between moral 
                                                
6 I did not conduct mediation analysis on moral judgment since the effects of power and status 











expectation and punishment is significant and negative, indicating that lower moral 
expectations caused more severe punishment for violators. Results show that 
participants previously expected higher-power violators to act less morally; these 
expectations, in turn, led participants to penalize higher-power violators more harshly 
relative to lower-power violators. 
Overall, violators’ power had a positive effect on the severity of the punishment 
imposed on them (β = 0.129), and the proportion of effect mediated by moral 
expectation is 41%. Taken together, compared to those with lower power, observers 
would punish higher-power evaluation targets more harshly for committing violations 
out of expectations that higher-power targets have lower morality.  
Table 5-13 Mediation Analysis for the Effect of Power on Moral Punishment 
 Coefficient Significance 
   
Power-Moral Expectation -.234 (-.391 to -.077) Yes 
Moral Expectation-Punishment -.235 (-.320 to -.149) Yes 
Mediated Effect .055 (.016 to .102) Yes 
Direct Effect .075 (-.042 to .191) No 
Total Effect .129 (.008 to .244) Yes 
   
% of Total Effect Mediated .41  
Number of observation is 450. 
95% Confidence intervals in parentheses. 
 
Table 5-14 reports a statistically significant effect of status on punishment 
mediated by moral expectations. The significant and positive coefficient for the 
relationship between status and moral expectation confirms my prediction that having 
a higher status would increase moral expectations developed by observers. Moreover, 





which identifies that higher moral expectations reduced the severity of proposed 
sanctions for violators. The mediation analysis reports that prior to violations, 
participants anticipated a higher moral character of higher-status evaluation targets 
relative to lower-status targets; these expectations later prompted participants to favor 
weaker punishment for those with greater status. 
In short, violators’ status had a negative effect on the severity of the punishment 
imposed on them (β = -0.222), and the proportion of effect mediated by moral 
expectation is 84%. As a whole, observers of moral violations would punish higher-
status violators less harshly compared to lower-status violators partly because they 
expected those of higher status to behave in a moral manner. 
Table 5-14 Mediation Analysis for the Effect of Status on Moral Punishment 
 Coefficient Significance 
   
Status-Moral Expectation .801 (.640 to .963) Yes 
Moral Expectation-Punishment -.231 (-.331 to -.131) Yes 
Mediated Effect -.185 (-.278 to -.099) Yes 
Direct Effect -.037 (-.162 to .087) No 
Total Effect -.222 (-.325 to -.120) Yes 
   
% of Total Effect Mediated .84  
Number of observation is 450. 






In addition to moral expectations, judgment, and punishment, I performed 
supplemental analyses on emotional and perceptual responses collected as part of the 
moral decision-making process. Table 5-15 documents the average responses for 
participant reactions to moral violations, separated by experimental conditions. 
Table 5-15 Means of Emotional and Perceptual Measures by Violator’s Power and Status 
Levels 







      
Power      
     Higher Power 7.35 (1.33) 4.02 (2.27) 5.52 (1.77) 6.81 (1.89) 150 
     Equal Power 7.44 (1.40) 3.88 (2.43) 5.41 (1.91) 6.74 (1.91) 150 
     Lower Power 7.68 (1.38) 3.80 (2.27) 5.35 (1.84) 6.66 (1.79) 150 
Status      
     Higher Status 7.58 (1.43) 3.76 (2.34) 5.71 (1.82) 6.73 (1.93) 150 
     Equal Status 7.44 (1.28) 3.78 (2.19) 5.50 (1.89) 6.60 (1.92) 150 
     Lower Status 7.45 (1.41) 4.16 (2.42) 5.07 (1.76) 6.89 (1.72) 150 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
First, results from the negative emotion index indicate that the intensity of 
negative feelings reduces as the power level of the violator increases. However, 
subsequent ANOVA tests report no associations between negative sentiments and the 





Second, when asked to assess the intent behind the immoral behavior, 
participants appear to have concluded that violators with higher power and lower status 
committed the violation on purpose relative to those with lower power and higher status, 
respectively. However, ANOVA tests reveal that these observed differences in 
attribution outcomes were not statistically significant between varying levels of power 
(F = 0.21; p = .807) and status (F = 1.44; p = .238). 
 Third, with respect to perceived hypocrisy, results from Table 5-15 indicate that 
violators at the high end of the power/status spectra were consistently rated as acting 
more hypocritical. An ANOVA model confirms significant variations between status 
conditions (F = 4.20; p = .015). A post-hoc Tukey’s t-test shows that participants 
regarded higher-status violators as more hypocritical than lower-status violators (t = 
2.88; two-tailed p = .012). However, the observed differences between power 
conditions were not statistically significant (F = 0.24; p = .789). 
 Finally, regarding the tendency to expose the immoral incident, results reveal 
that, relative to lower-power violators, participants were more likely to report the 
incident when confronted with higher-power violators. However, ANOVA tests 
demonstrate no significant differences between the experimental conditions (F = 0.23; 








Section 3 Discussion 
Results from Study 1 confirm most of my predictions. Specifically, in support 
of Hypothesis 1, when controlling for status level, participants expected higher-power 
evaluation targets to be less moral than lower-power targets. Furthermore, I found 
evidence supporting Hypothesis 2 that participants held higher moral expectations 
about targets with higher status relative to lower status, regardless of power level. 
 Support was also identified for Hypothesis 3. Specifically, compared to power, 
status was found to have a greater effect on moral expectations when status and power 
were both in place. The analysis indicates that moral expectations varied by the amount 
of power and status; both of these findings were statistically significant. However, 
further tests confirm that status more robustly predicted moral expectations than power, 
with respect to both the strength of association and the magnitude of effect. Moreover, 
although consistent with the argument that individuals occupying lower-power-and-
higher-status positions and those at higher-power-and-lower-status positions are 
expected to be the most and least moral respectively, results do not show 
an interaction between lower power and higher status. 
I found evidence in partial support of Hypothesis 4A predicting that observers 
of moral violations will view the conduct of higher-power violators as more immoral 
and favor stronger punishment compared to lower-power violators. Indeed, participants 
proposed tougher sanctions for violators with higher power relative to lower power. 
However, in terms of perceived immorality, results showed no differences between the 





power violators harshly potentially due to their expectations of lower morality about 
these violators. 
Similarly, mixed support was identified for Hypothesis 4B predicting that 
observers will view the conduct of higher-status violators as more immoral but prefer 
weaker punishment compared to lower-status violators. Despite no significant 
differences in moral judgment, participants consistently chose to punish higher-status 
violators less severely relative to lower-status violators. Higher-status violators were 
perceived as more hypocritical than violators with lower status in part because 
participants expected them to exhibit higher morality. However, the appraisals did not 
affect how participants evaluated the immoral behavior, and they favored less harsh 
penalties for violators with higher status relative to lower status. Additionally, results 
from mediation analysis suggest participants’ higher moral expectations partially 
explained their lenient treatments to higher-status violators. 
Finally, participants in both relative and observed experimental contexts reacted 
similarly in terms of developing moral expectations and moral judgment. They 
anticipated lower morality in higher-power evaluation targets and higher morality in 
higher-status targets compared to those with lower standing. In addition, participants 
disapproved of the immoral conduct of all types of violators, and yet they intended to 
punish lower-power violators and higher-status violators less harshly compared to their 
respective counterparts. However, an alternative explanation could be a 
methodological limitation of the vignette design in this study. I elaborated on potential 







There are several limitations of Study 1. First, the overall rejection rate of this 
study is nearly 19%, which is a bit high for experimental research. Although I ran 
additional analyses in which I included rejected data and found results similar to those 
reported in the results section, participants’ attention remained a potential concern 
throughout the data collection process in an online setting. Furthermore, it was not 
possible to connect to participants who withdrew and account for their decisions if they 
opted out of the study without first having registered for the study on MTurk or 
completed the survey portion on Qualtrics. In other words, I was not able to identify 
potential systematic differences in demographic characteristics and moral attitudes 
between participants who completed and those who withdrew from the study. 
Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting the results given that the collected 
survey responses might have been skewed by participants who demonstrated an interest 
in completing the study. 
Second, the vignette design was limited in terms of having participants 
experience differential levels of power and status as well as signifiers of a moral 
violation. After all, hypothetical situations have no bearing on real-life consequences. 
Specifically, the non-differential outcomes between relative and observed contexts 
might have in part resulted from that participants were distantly subjected to the 
amounts of power and status held by the evaluation targets. Non-significant results of 
the perceptual and emotional responses also suggested a reduced impact of witnessing 
an immoral incident through vignettes. Moreover, both the preferences for punishment 





thus likely that participants became less personally invested in the judging and 
punishing process, as though they were making decisions that would not bring 
significance to the hypothetical scenario and their roles in it. 
I attempted to address these concerns in Study 2 where I conducted a laboratory 
experiment to rigorously examine my hypotheses in a more controlled environment. 
The experimental design focused on the relative context where participants interacted 
with evaluation targets who had variable amounts of power and status compared to the 
participants. Additionally, participants could react to violations with substantive and 
costly punishments. This allowed me to create a space in which participants were more 





Chapter 6: Study 2 
In this study, I tested Hypothesis 5 and more rigorously examined Hypotheses 
1 - 4B in a controlled environment. I predict in Hypotheses 1 - 4B the effects of power 
and status on moral expectations as well as judgment and punishment for moral 
violators. In Hypothesis 5, I predict the effect of retaliation risks on the punishing 
behavior of individuals who witness moral violations. Compared to Study 1, I removed 
emotion assessments but incorporated behavioral measures for the responses to moral 
violations in the present design. Participants were students enrolled at the University 
of Maryland at the time of recruitment and registered for the study on the Sona Systems 
website. Sona Systems is a commercial software for online participant management 
that offers a range of services including setting up studies, managing session schedules, 
and prescreening participants. During the recruitment, I gave potential participants 
instructions on how to access and sign up for my study on the Sona Systems website.7 
Recruitment materials and images for the online registration process are shown in 
Appendix C. 
 I conducted experimental sessions at the computer labs administered by the 
Office of Academic Computing Services (OACS) at the University of Maryland. In 
each session, participants were evenly distributed and scattered across two computer 
rooms to avoid potential interference. 
                                                
7  My study was listed on both websites for the Group Processes Lab of the sociology 





Section 1 Methods 
General Design and Conditions 
 I conducted a laboratory experiment where participants made moral judgment 
and punishment decisions on violations committed by an evaluation target in a group 
game. Specifically, as a fictitious game partner, the evaluation target was installed with 
varying levels of power and status compared to the participants. I manipulated the 
relative levels of power and status utilizing conventional methods in social 
psychological experiments. Regarding moral violations, I devised multiple occasions 
where participants witnessed deceptive behavior of the target person in the game. To 
create fears of retaliation in participants, I implemented different rules of the game that 
would or would not expose punishment decisions of the participants. Moral 
expectations, as well as views and actions taken by participants in response to observed 
violations, were surveyed throughout the game. 
I adapted the experimental design from van de Ven and Villeval's (2015) two-
person deception game. In their original design, participants were paired into groups of 
two, with each taking the role of a sender or a receiver. The purpose of the game was 
for the sender who had full information about payoff outcomes to communicate with 
the receiver who had no information but had absolute decision-making power about the 
payoff outcomes. The sender was able to send deceptive messages to prompt the 
receiver to choose an option that would benefit the sender but hurt earnings of the 
receiver. However, the receiver might or might not follow messages from the sender. 
For this study, I kept a similar format to the group game setting but made the 





game. Second, participants were always assigned to the observer role, while the sender 
and the receiver roles were filled by partners of the participants that were, in fact, 
computer simulations. Third, in addition to sending either a truthful or a deceptive 
message to the receiver, the sender had a third option to not send a message. Fourth, 
and most importantly, the observer (i.e., participants) had complete knowledge 
regarding both payoff outcomes and messages selected by the sender. In other words, 
the observer was able to identify whether or not the sender told a lie. As programmed 
by the computer, the observer would witness multiple episodes of deception where the 
sender communicated false information to the receiver. Furthermore, every time when 
a deception occurred, the observer could punish the sender by taking away potential 
earnings of the sender. 
 Table 6-1 displays four experimental conditions of power and status: violators 
(i.e., the sender, Partner A) had higher power with higher status; lower power with 
higher status; higher power with lower status; or lower power with lower status than 
both victims (i.e., the receiver, Partner B) and observers (i.e., participants). As 
illustrated, the power and status differences between victims and observers were 
controlled and minimized. To make it clearer, fake partners A and B were referred to 
as game partners of participants in the study. During the game, Partner A acted as the 
sender, Partner B played the receiver role, and participants were assigned to be the 
observer. When Partner A sent a deceptive message as programmed by the computer, 
it became the violator while Partner B turned into the victim. In short, Partner A who 





Table 6-1 Power and Status Conditions in Study 2 





    
Condition 1 Higher Power & Higher Status 
Lower Power & 
Lower Status 
Lower Power & 
Lower Status 
Condition 2 Lower Power & Higher Status 
Higher Power & 
Lower Status 
Higher Power & 
Lower Status 
Condition 3 Higher Power & Lower Status 
Lower Power & 
Higher Status 
Lower Power & 
Higher Status 
Condition 4 Lower Power & Lower Status 
Higher Power & 
Higher Status 
Higher Power & 
Higher Status 
    
 
I manipulated status differences using contrast sensitivity test scores and 
demographic information. The contrast sensitivity test is commonly used by 
experimental research in social psychology to create conferred respect on the basis of 
perceived competence with the test. The test is made up and has no indications of a 
fake contrast sensitivity ability. For the purpose of manipulation, I told participants that 
higher test scores were associated with better performances in the group game. 
To create a perceived status of the observer lower than that of the violator in 
Condition 1 and 2, I provided participants with the following information about their 
partners in the study. Partner A was a 24-year-old male graduate student with a college 
GPA of 3.9, and Partner B was a 19-year-old female undergraduate student with a 
current college GPA of 2.1. Additionally, Partner A did better than both Partner B and 
participants on the contrast sensitivity test. 
As for participants assigned to Condition 3 and 4 where the observer had a 
status higher than that of the violator, I presented the opposite information. Specifically, 





B, the male graduate student with a relatively high GPA. I also highlighted that Partner 
A performed worse on the test than both Partner B and participants. 
In terms of power manipulation, I employed differential access to material 
resources. To be precise, certain group members were given the ability to distribute 
bonus rewards at the end of the study. I explained to participants that partner A was 
assigned the control over group rewards in Condition 1 and 3 where the observer had 
lower power than the violator. Conversely, I announced in Condition 2 and 4 where the 
observer had higher power than the violator that both Partner B and participants were 
chosen to distribute rewards. 
I adopted a within-subject design in which all participants underwent two 
conditions of retaliation risk for punishing violators. To facilitate an environment 
where the violator could retaliate, I created two different rules of the game that 
specified whether or not punishment decisions of the observer would be made public 
during the game. Logically, by exposing the identity of the observer, the violator would 
be able to target their revengeful acts. Therefore, participants would be facing a higher 
risk of retaliation when sanctioning violators in a context where the decisions were 
exposed compared to where they were kept unknown. Additionally, the retaliatory 
capacity of the violator was designed to be tied to the power manipulation method. That 
is, violators could retaliate by utilizing their control over bonus rewards. 
 Each participant had a unique identification number consisting of the condition, 
location, and order of participation in the study. I randomly assigned participants to one 
of the four experimental conditions using an online dice-roll simulator. The two 






 I scheduled between one and 12 participants for each study session. In order to 
maintain an appearance of a group study and lead participants to believe they were 
interacting with real partners, one experimenter would act as a confederate in the study 
when only one participant showed up for a session. When more than six participants 
signed up for a session, they would be split into two rooms each led by an experimenter. 
The objective was to have participants witness that at least one individual other than 
themselves was participating in the study. 
When participants arrived at the OACS computer labs, they were greeted and 
directed to seats. After participants gave consent to participation in the study, 
experimenters provided a brief introduction and an overview of the tasks involved in 
the study. Experimenters announced that participants would complete an individual test, 
a group game, and several surveys on computers. Participants learned that for the game 
they would be paired with two partners who were seated in different rooms. Although 
they would not be able to interact face-to-face, participants would receive information 
about their partners prior to the game. Experimenters also explained that the amount of 
cash compensation for the study would be determined by both outcomes of the group 
game and bonus rewards distributed after the game. Task instructions were always 
displayed on computer monitors and elaborated by experimenters when needed. 
Participants began the study by completing a series of demographic questions. 
They then proceeded to the contrast sensitivity test which involved comparing the 
composition of black and white squares in images displayed on the monitor (see an 





indicator of how well individuals usually perform in the following group game. After 
the test, experimenters handed out sheets of information about participants’ fake 
partners. The profile sheets listed demographic and academic information, along with 
contrast sensitivity test scores and which group member had control over bonus 
rewards. 
 
Figure 6-1 A Screen Shot Example for Contrast Sensitivity Test Image 
 
As illustrated in both Table 6-1 and the text above, participants received 
information about Partner A and Partner B according to the experimental condition 
they were assigned. For example, participants who were assigned to have higher power 
with lower status compared to the violator in Condition 2 received the following partner 
profile. The profile sheet described Partner A as a 24-year-old male graduate student 
with a college GPA of 3.9 and Partner B as a 19-year-old female undergraduate student 
with a current college GPA of 2.1. Additionally, the sheet reported a contrast sensitivity 





Moreover, the sheet marked that Partner B and participants shared control over bonus 
rewards. Details of the profile sheets are presented in Appendix D. 
 After taking some time to read through the profile sheets, participants 
responded to an evaluation survey on moral expectations about their partners. When 
participants were finished, experimenters left the room, pretending to check the 
progress of the study session in the other room. Upon returning, experimenters guided 
participants to proceed to the group game. 
 Instructions explained that the game involved a sender, a receiver, and an 
observer. At the beginning of any given round, two payoff options would be presented 
to the sender and the observer. A table would show the number of points the sender and 
the receiver could earn with each option. The sender would then choose to take one of 
the three following action: send a truthful message, a false message, or no message to 
the receiver about the payoff options (see an example in Figure 6-2). After getting a 
message from the sender, the receiver would choose an option. 
 





The observer would be given 10 points at the beginning of each round. 
Whenever the sender selected a false message, the observer would be able to punish 
the sender by spending their own points deducting the points of the sender. The amount 
could not be rolled over but would be accumulated and eventually converted into cash 
payment for the observer. The punishment functioned in a way that the number of 
points removed from the sender’s earning would be three times as large as the amount 
the observer allocated. The observer could not punish the sender for delivering truthful 
or no messages (see an example in Figure 6-3). The receiver would be blind to both 
payoff and punishment information before selecting a final option. 
 
Figure 6-3 A Screen Shot Example for Making Punishment Decisions 
 
After participants finished reading the instructions, they had to pass a short quiz 
in order to proceed to the game. The questions were designed to ensure that participants 
fully and correctly understood the procedure and rules of the game. After they passed 
the quiz, participants learned that they were assigned as the observer while Partner A 
and B were assigned the sender and the receiver respectively (Table 6-1). Participants 
then went through a practice round before formally starting the game. In total, 
participants completed six rounds of the game. The payoff structure differed in each 





programmed to send a deceptive message in four out of six rounds, send a truthful 
message in one round, and send no messages in one round. In other words, as the 
observer, participants were offered four opportunities to punish the violator. 
As noted earlier, due to a within-subject design, participants completed 
conditions of both high and low retaliation risks where the violator would or would not 
be aware of punishment decisions. Half of the participants learned that their punishment 
decisions would be made public in the first three rounds but be kept anonymous in the 
remaining three rounds. The other half of participants, by contrast, had their 
punishment decisions first undisclosed and later revealed to the group. To summarize, 
concerning the number of punishment decisions participants had to make, two of them 
would be disclosed to the group in the high-risk condition and the other two would stay 
anonymous in the low-risk condition. 
 After participants completed the group game, they answered questions 
regarding their views on the behavior of both partners during the game as well as 
associational preferences for the partners. Participants later responded to a final survey 
that checked suspicion about fictitious partners, power and status manipulations, and 
purpose of the study. In the end, experimenters debriefed, thanked, and paid each 
participant $15.8 The entire study session lasted about 45 minutes. 
                                                
8 Prior to implementing a protocol change in compensation options, I paid the first quarter of 
participants in the study each $12. Subsequent to the change, a portion of participants chose a 
combination of course credit and $5. These different incentives for participation in the study 






 Expectations of Morality. As in Study 1, I measured moral expectations 
utilizing an index of 14 pairs of characteristics adapted from Stets and Carter's (2012). 
Participants assessed each pair of the characteristics describing the evaluation target in 
a randomized order on an eight-point bipolar scale. Results were averaged and recoded 
so that a higher index rating indicates higher moral expectations. Details of both the 
question and index are shown in Appendix D. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 
reliability for the moral expectation index is 0.86. 
Moral Judgment. Judgment on the behavior of the target was measured with 
four evaluation statements: (1) “Partner A valued cooperation over competition.”; (2) 
“Partner A’s behavior was problematic.”; (3) “Partner A acted fairly to others.”; and 
(4) “Partner A’s behavior was moral. 9 ” Participants indicated the extent of their 
agreement with each statement on an eight-point scale, ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 8 (strongly agree). Results were averaged and recoded so that higher index 
ratings represent harsher views of the behavior. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 
reliability for the moral judgment index is 0.79. 
Punishment. Punishment decisions were assessed by the number of points 
participants spent on taking away the potential earnings from the violator. Participants 
were installed with 10 points at the beginning of each round. Participants could choose 
to allocate all available points; however, as the way payoff options and rules were 
structured, in practice participants could only use up to five points to deduct earnings 
                                                
9 There was a fifth statement in this series of questions: “Partner A’s behavior was excusable.” 
It was not included in the index because results from both Cronbach’s reliability test and 





of the violator at each punishing decision. Two scales were thus created on the basis of 
simply the responses inserted by participants (0 to 10 points) and the portion that 
effectively demonstrated a punishing purpose (0 to 5 points). Results of four punishing 
decisions were aggregated so that higher amounts indicate more severe penalties. 
Analyses on both amounts of punishment allotment before and after adjustment are 
presented in the results section. 
In addition to the above variables used in hypothesis testing, I included two 
measures in the study design to engage participants more in the group game and for an 
exploratory purpose: 
Expected Moral Behavior. I constructed a scale to assess behavioral 
expectations about the target in the game. At the beginning of each round, participants 
were asked which message they would send if they were the sender: truthful, deceptive, 
or no messages. Results were averaged and recoded into a binary measure where 1 
indicates always sending truthful or no messages and 0 indicates always choosing 
deceptive messages. In short, the closer a scale value approaches 1, the more frequently 
the participants expected the target to behave morally throughout the game. 
Associational Preferences. I measured the associational preferences of 
participants for the evaluation target using an index of two statements. Participants 
responded to the statements, “I would like Partner A as a [friend/classmate to work on 
a course project with] …” on an eight-point scale with 1 representing strongly disagree 
and 8 indicating strongly agree. Results were averaged and axes aligned so that a higher 
index rating shows greater preferences. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability 





Section 2 Results 
Participants 
A total of 238 participants gave consent to participate in the study. However, a 
session filled with 10 participants was canceled due to an emergency incident that 
occurred at the beginning of the study. 10  Additionally, following the objective to 
maintain an appearance of group interaction, two participants who registered for two 
separate study sessions were sent away before the study started because there were no 
confederates available or other participants in presence to act as “partners.” 
 Eventually, I collected data from a total of 226 participants. Of these, three 
participants showed a lack of reasonable compliance and attention required during the 
study. Another four participants reported during the debriefing that their suspicion 
about fictitious partners had altered behavior in the study to an extent where their 
responses might have been no longer valid for analysis. In terms of manipulation check 
items, 53 participants did not correctly identify the levels of power and status held by 
the evaluation target. The removal of these cases rendered a rejection rate of 26.5%. 
Supplemental analyses that included all 226 cases of data revealed findings similar to 
those from the primary analysis population. Additionally, except for the high numbers 
of failed manipulation checks in both Condition 2 and 3, I found no systematic 
differences between participants included and excluded from analyses. 11  After 
                                                
10 A problem report was submitted and acknowledged by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
after the incident. 
11 Compared to Condition 1 and 4, the evaluation targets had imbalanced levels of power and 
status in Condition 2 and 3. I suspect that participants conflated power and status, and therefore 
had difficulty affirming observations where power and status did not vary together. These 
concerns were identified half way through the data collection. In response, I included additional 





rejections, 166 participants were included in the primary analysis population, with 41 
participants in Condition 1, 43 participants in Condition 2, 43 participants in Condition 
3, and 39 participants in Condition 4.12 
With respect to the primary analysis population, 33% of participants were male, 
and 67% were female. 8% of the sample were graduate students, and the mean age was 
20. Regarding race and ethnicity, 40% of participants self-identified as non-Hispanic 
White, 17% listed non-Hispanic Black, 32% reported Asian, 7% were Hispanic, and 
4% belonged to other racial and ethnic groups. In terms of subjective socioeconomic 
status compared to others in the U.S., participants responded on a scale, ranging from 
1 (having the least money, the least education, and the least respected jobs or no jobs) 
to 10 (having the most money, the most education, and the most respected jobs). 51% 
of participants selected a number from one to four, 38% responded with five or six, and 
11% chose between seven and ten. 
 
Hypothesis Tests 
 I predict in Hypothesis 1 that observers will have lower levels of moral 
expectations about evaluation targets holding higher power relative to those holding 
lower power. Table 6-2 reports moral expectation scores between evaluation targets 
who had higher power and who had lower power than participants. Clearly, the 
differences were minimal. 
                                                
12 I ran additional analyses on a subset of 127 cases after excluding participants who showed 
any indication of suspicion about fictitious partners. Results were similar to those reported in 





Table 6-2 Moral Expectation Index between Power Conditions 
 Moral Expectations N 
   
Higher Power 5.07 (0.86) 84 
Lower Power 5.03 (0.78) 82 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
An ANOVA test revealed in Table 6-3 confirms that controlling for 
participants’ demographics, differences in expectations scores between the two power 
conditions were not statistically significant (F = 0.27; p = .601). Therefore, results do 
not support the first hypothesis that observers will develop lower moral expectations 
about evaluation targets with higher power compared to those with lower power. 
Table 6-3 ANOVA Test for Moral Expectation Index between Power Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 14 5.181 0.370 0.53 .913 
      
Higher Power vs Lower 
Power  1 0.192 0.192 0.27 .601 
      
   Gender 1 0.524 0.524 0.75 .388 
   Age 1 0.027 0.027 0.04 .845 
   Race 4 0.580 0.145 0.21 .934 
   Subjective SES 6 2.729 0.455 0.65 .690 
   Game Points Earned 1 1.277 1.277 1.82 .179 
      
Residual 151 105.816 0.701   
      
R-squared 0.0467 
N 166 







I predict in Hypothesis 2 that observers will have higher levels of moral 
expectations about evaluation targets with higher status relative to those with lower 
status. Table 6-4 shows the average scores of moral expectations for evaluation targets 
with a status higher or lower than participants. 
Table 6-4 Moral Expectation Index between Status Conditions 
 Moral Expectations N 
   
Higher Status 5.31 (0.73) 84 
Lower Status 4.78 (0.82) 82 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Results from an ANOVA test in Table 6-5 indicate that the documented 
differences in expectation scores between the two status conditions were statistically 
significant (F = 18.61; p < .001). Post-hoc analysis reports that participants expected 
higher-status evaluation targets to display higher morality than lower-status targets (t 
= 4.31; two-tailed p < .001). As a result, the findings confirm the second hypothesis 
that observers will develop higher moral expectations about evaluation targets who 











Table 6-5 ANOVA Test for Moral Expectation Index between Status Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 14 16.623 1.187 1.90 .030 
      
Higher Status vs Lower 
Status 1 11.634 11.634 18.61*** .000 
      
   Gender 1 0.027 0.027 0.04 .836 
   Age 1 0.776 0.776 1.24 .267 
   Race 4 0.905 0.226 0.36 .835 
   Subjective SES 6 2.312 0.385 0.62 .716 
   Game Points Earned 1 0.895 0.895 1.43 .233 
      
Residual 151 94.374 0.625   
      
R-squared 0.1498 
N 166 
















I predict in Hypothesis 3 that when observers develop moral expectations about 
evaluation targets, they will base moral expectations more on the amount of status than 
the amount of power held by the targets. One observation consistent with this 
hypothesis was worth noting. As seen in Figure 6-4, when comparing across the 
experimental conditions, participants expected evaluation targets with both higher 
power and higher status to exhibit higher morality than those with lower power and 
lower status (t = 3.04; two-tailed p = .003). The evidence suggests that a positive effect 
of having higher status on moral expectations might have outweighed a potentially 
negative effect resulting from occupying a higher-power position. 
 
Figure 6-4 Moral Expectation Index by Violator’s Power and Status Levels (Standard 
Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Table 6-6 examines the differences in moral expectation scores between power 
and status conditions. When both demographics and potential earnings of participants 
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expectation scores for evaluation targets (F = 18.33; p < .001), while levels of power 
held by the targets indicate no effects (F = 0.13; p = .721). 
Table 6-6 ANOVA Test for Moral Expectation Index across Power and Status Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 15 16.703 1.114 1.77 .043 
      
Higher Power vs Lower 
Power 1 0.080 0.080 0.13 .721 
Higher Status vs Lower 
Status 1 11.522 11.522 18.33*** .000 
      
   Gender 1 0.037 0.037 0.06 .809 
   Age 1 0.708 0.708 1.13 .290 
   Race 4 0.919 0.230 0.37 .832 
   Subjective SES 6 2.249 0.375 0.60 .732 
   Game Points Earned 1 0.899 0.899 1.43 .233 
      
Residual 150 94.294 0.629   
      
R-squared 0.1505 
N 166 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
 
Consistent with the significance test, results from Table 6-7 indicate a stronger 
association between moral expectations and status relative to power. Specifically, 
nearly zero percent of variations in expectation scores explained by the model was 








Table 6-7 Effect Sizes for Power and Status on Moral Expectation Index 
 df Omega-Squared 95% Confidence Interval 
     
Model 15 .066 .000 to .093 
     
Power Conditions 1 .000 .000 to .026 
Status Conditions 1 .103 .026 to .201 
    
   Gender 1 .000 .000 to .020 
   Age 1 .001 .000 to .050 
   Race 4 .000 .000 to .005 
   Subjective SES 6 .000 .000 to .007 
   Game Points Earned 1 .003 .000 to .055 
    
Omega-Squared values for individual factors are partial. 
 
Taken together, not only status was the single factor in the model that was 
statistically significant, it also caused more substantial differences to moral expectation 
scores than power. Therefore, the findings confirm my third hypothesis that in the 
development of moral expectations about evaluation targets, observers will depend 












I predict in Hypothesis 4A that observers of moral violations will hold harsher 
views and propose more severe penalties for higher-power violators relative to lower-
power violators. Table 6-8 displays the moral judgment index and the total amount of 
punishment from participants who evaluated targets with different levels of power. 
Table 6-8 Moral Judgment Index and Sum of Punishments between Power Conditions 
 Moral Judgment Unadjusted Punishment 
Adjusted 
Punishment N 
     
Higher Power 5.55 (1.02) 16.21 (9.14) 12.56 (4.47) 84 
Lower Power 5.64 (1.23) 16.65 (9.59) 13.05 (5.09) 82 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
The unadjusted punishment amount ranges from 0 to 40, and the adjusted punishment 
amount ranges from 0 to 20.  
 
When asked about how they viewed the act of the evaluation target during the 
game, participants appeared to judge lower-power violators more harshly relative to 
those with higher power (Table 6-8; left column). However, the ANOVA test in Table 
6-9 demonstrates that the observed differences in average ratings of moral judgment 
index between the two power conditions were not statistically significant (F = 0.08; p 











Table 6-9 ANOVA Test for Moral Judgment Index between Power Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 14 27.002 1.929 1.59 .087 
      
Higher Power vs Lower 
Power 1 0.098 0.098 0.08 .776 
      
   Gender 1 0.456 0.456 0.38 .540 
   Age 1 1.756 1.756 1.45 .230 
   Race 4 14.410 3.602 2.97* .021 
   Subjective SES 6 12.292 2.049 1.69 .127 
   Game Points Earned 1 0.080 0.080 0.07 .798 
      
Residual 151 183.035 1.212   
      
R-squared 0.1286 
N 166 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
 
The central and right columns in Table 6-8 respectively report the number of 
points spent by participants on punishment before and after adjusted to a capped 
amount. Results from both scales indicate that participants were more likely to give up 
potential earnings in order to penalize lower-power violators compared to higher-power 
violators. However, when accounting for retaliation risks, ANOVA tests in Table 6-10 
and 6-11 show that the adjusted (F = 0.43; p = .511) and unadjusted punishment 







Table 6-10 Repeated-Measures ANOVA for Sum of Adjusted Punishments between Power 
Conditions (Controlling for Retaliation Risks) 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 166 1887.910 11.373 2.22 .000 
      
Higher Power vs Lower 
Power 1 4.966 4.966 0.43 .511 
   Between-Subjects 
Error Term 164 1879.254 11.459   
      
   Retaliation Risk 
Conditions 1 3.690 3.690 0.72 .397 
      
Residual 165 845.810 5.126   
      
R-squared 0.6906 
N 332 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
Retaliation risk is a within-subject factor. 
 
Table 6-11 Repeated-Measures ANOVA for Sum of Unadjusted Punishments between Power 
Conditions (Controlling for Retaliation Risks) 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 166 7236.102 43.591 3.31 .000 
      
Higher Power vs Lower 
Power 1 3.873 3.873 0.09 .766 
   Between-Subjects 
Error Term 164 7196.443 43.881   
      
   Retaliation Risk 
Conditions 1 35.786 35.786 2.72 .100 
      
Residual 165 2169.714 13.150   
      
R-squared 0.7693 
N 332 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 





As a result, Hypothesis 4A is not supported: relative to lower-power violators, 
observers of moral violations did not view the behavior of higher-power violators as 




I predict in Hypothesis 4B that, compared to lower-status violators, observers 
of moral violations will view the conduct of higher-status violators as more immoral 
but favor weaker sanctions. Table 6-12 reveals moral judgment and punishment 
decisions of participants when they evaluated targets occupying varied status positions. 
Table 6-12 Moral Judgment Index and Sum of Punishments between Status Conditions 
 Moral Judgment Unadjusted Punishment 
Adjusted 
Punishment N 
     
Higher Status 5.57 (1.16) 16.95 (10.11) 12.74 (4.81) 84 
Lower Status 5.61 (1.10) 15.89 (8.50) 12.87 (4.77) 82 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
The unadjusted punishment amount ranges from 0 to 40, and the adjusted punishment 
amount ranges from 0 to 20. 
 
Results from the left column in Table 6-12 indicate that participants might have 
perceived the deceptive behavior of lower-status violators as more immoral than that 
of higher-status violators. However, an ANOVA test in Table 6-13 demonstrates no 







Table 6-13 ANOVA Test for Moral Judgment Index between Status Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 14 28.154 2.011 1.67 .067 
      
Higher Status vs Lower 
Status 1 1.251 1.251 1.04 .309 
      
   Gender 1 0.222 0.222 0.18 .668 
   Age 1 2.438 2.438 2.02 .156 
   Race 4 15.007 3.752 3.11* .017 
   Subjective SES 6 13.475 2.246 1.86† .090 
   Game Points Earned 1 0.117 0.117 0.10 .755 
      
Residual 151 181.882 1.205   
      
R-squared 0.1340 
N 166 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
 
With respect to penalizing the evaluation targets for sending false messages in 
the game, a mixed trend of outcomes was identified contingent on the adjustment of 
punishment allotments. As seen in the central column in Table 6-12, when the number 
of points spent on punishment was not adjusted, participants were more likely to 
penalize violators with higher status. Conversely, results from the right column in the 
table show that after the allotments were adjusted, participants seemed to propose 
tougher sanctions for lower-status violators relative to higher-status violators. However, 
these differences in both adjusted (F = 0.03; p = .863) and unadjusted outcomes (F = 
0.53; p = .465) between the status conditions were not statistically significant as 





Table 6-14 Repeated-Measures ANOVA for Sum of Adjusted Punishments between Status 
Conditions (Controlling for Retaliation Risks) 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 166 1887.910 11.373 2.22 .000 
      
Higher Status vs Lower 
Status 1 0.339 0.339 0.03 .863 
   Between-Subjects 
Error Term 164 1883.881 11.487   
      
   Retaliation Risk 
Conditions 1 3.690 3.690 0.72 .397 
      
Residual 165 845.810 5.126   
      
R-squared 0.6906 
N 332 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
Retaliation risk is a within-subject factor. 
 
Table 6-15 Repeated-Measures ANOVA for Sum of Unadjusted Punishments between Status 
Conditions (Controlling for Retaliation Risks) 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 166 7236.102 43.591 3.31 .000 
      
Higher Status vs Lower 
Status 1 23.405 23.405 0.53 .465 
   Between-Subjects 
Error Term 164 7176.911 43.762   
      
   Retaliation Risk 
Conditions 1 35.786 35.786 2.72 .100 
      
Residual 165 2169.714 13.150   
      
R-squared 0.7693 
N 332 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 





Therefore, results do not support Hypothesis 4B by showing that, compared to 
violators of lower status, observers did not judge more harshly or propose weaker 




 I predict in Hypothesis 5 that when violators can retaliate, observers of moral 
violations will favor weaker punishment for higher-power violators compared to lower-
power violators. As mentioned previously, this study adopts a within-subject design 
where half of the participants’ punishment decisions were known to partners while the 
other half were anonymous. The public setting allowed violators to retaliate by 
exposing both the identity and decisions of the participants, whereas violators received 
no information in the anonymous setting. Table 6-16 presents the amount of 
punishment imposed by participants when they faced differential risks of retaliation 
from violators who had higher or lower power relative to participants. 
Table 6-16 Sum of Punishments by Violator’s Power Level and Risk of Retaliation 
 Unadjusted Punishment Adjusted Punishment 







     
Higher Power 8.60 (5.82) 7.62 (4.72) 6.44 (2.84) 6.12 (2.83) 
Lower Power 8.49 (5.62) 8.16 (5.13) 6.57 (2.93) 6.48 (2.94) 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
The unadjusted punishment amount ranges between 0 to 20, and the adjusted punishment 






The grouped columns on the left side of Table 6-16 display the number of points 
participants allocated before being adjusted. Results show that, compared to lower-
power violators, participants were more likely to penalize higher-power violators when 
the punishment decisions were kept anonymous. Conversely, participants appeared to 
punish those with greater power less harshly when the decisions were made public to 
partners. However, the ANOVA coefficient for the interaction between power and 
retaliation risk in Table 6-17 reveals that participants did not sanction different types 
of violators on the basis of the risk they were facing (F = 0.66; p = .418). In fact, their 
punishment decisions did not even differ between a low-risk and a high-risk condition 
(F = 2.68; p = .103). In other words, participants did not penalize violators differentially 
depending on the relative power held by the violators as well as the risk of retribution 
from the violators. 
Table 6-17 Repeated-Measures ANOVA for Sum of Unadjusted Punishments across Power 
and Retaliation Risk Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 167 7244.785 43.382 3.29 .000 
      
Higher Power vs Lower Power 1 3.873 3.873 0.09 .766 
   Between-Subjects Error Term 164 7196.443 43.881   
      
Higher vs Lower Retaliation Risk 1 35.357 35.357 2.68 .103 
   Interaction between Power and 
Retaliation Risk Conditions 1 8.683 8.683 0.66 .418 
      
Residual 164 2161.031 13.177   
      
R-squared 0.7702 
N 332 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 





The grouped columns on the right side of Table 6-16 refer to the penalties 
proposed by participants after adjustment. As seen in the table, relative to lower-power 
violators, participants consistently favored weaker sanctions for those with greater 
power in both public and anonymous settings. However, subsequent tests in Table 6-
18 demonstrate that differences in punishment for higher-power and lower-power 
violators did not vary by retaliation risks (F = 0.20; p = .653). In addition, participants 
did not respond differently to the two conditions of retaliation risk (F = 0.71; p = .401). 
All in all, Hypothesis 5 is not supported: relative to lower-power violators, observers 
of moral violations did not penalize higher-power violators less severely who could 
retaliate against them.13 
Table 6-18 Repeated-Measures ANOVA for Sum of Adjusted Punishments across Power and 
Retaliation Risk Conditions 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 167 1888.949 11.311 2.20 .000 
      
Higher Power vs Lower Power 1 4.966 4.966 0.43 .511 
   Between-Subjects Error Term 164 1879.254 11.459   
      
Higher vs Lower Retaliation Risk 1 3.642 3.642 0.71 .401 
   Interaction between Power and 
Retaliation Risk Conditions 1 1.040 1.040 0.20 .653 
      
Residual 164 844.770 5.151   
      
R-squared 0.6910 
N 332 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
 
                                                
13 Additional analyses on the amount of punishment broken down by status level and risk of 






 I conducted additional analyses utilizing the same data collected from the 
primary analysis population. I presented findings regarding the interaction of power 
and status, behavioral expectations for morality, and associational preferences. 
 Moral expectations about evaluation targets vary by the relative levels of power 
and status between the targets and the participants, as illustrated in Figure 6-4. Indeed, 
an ANOVA test confirms significant variations in moral expectation index between the 
four experimental conditions (F = 7.32; p < .001). Interestingly, evaluation targets who 
had both higher power and higher status than participants seemed to receive higher 
expectation scores compared to those with lower power and higher status. Although a 
post-hoc Tukey’s t-test indicates no significant differences in expectation scores 
between these two conditions (t = -1.50; two-tailed p = .443), another aspect to consider 
is the interaction between power and status. Controlling for characteristics of the 
participants, Table 6-19 examines the effects of power and status on moral expectations 











Table 6-19 ANOVA Test for Moral Expectation Index for the Effects of Power, Status, and 
their Interaction 
 df SS MS F p-value 
      
Model 16 18.608 1.163 1.88 .026 
      
Higher Power vs Lower 
Power 1 0.089 0.089 0.14 .705 
Higher Status vs Lower 
Status 1 11.161 11.161 18.00*** .000 
   Higher Power x 
Higher Status 1 1.905 1.905 3.07† .081 
      
   Gender 1 0.069 0.069 0.11 .738 
   Age 1 0.575 0.575 0.93 .337 
   Race 4 0.800 0.200 0.32 .862 
   Subjective SES 6 2.379 0.396 0.64 .698 
   Game Points Earned 1 1.120 1.120 1.81 .180 
      
Residual 149 92.388 0.620   
      
R-squared 0.1676 
N 166 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.1 
 
Results from the ANOVA model show that while power indicates no effect (F 
= 0.14; p = .705), status robustly predicts moral expectation scores (F = 18.00; p <.001). 
Additionally, an interaction between the two constructs is statistically significant (F = 
3.07; p = .081). A subsequent Tukey’s t-test confirms higher expectation scores for 
evaluation targets holding both higher power and higher status than those with lower 
power and lower status (t = 1.75; two-tailed p = .082). The analysis reveals that when 
developing moral expectations about evaluation targets, observers would base their 





observers might expect particularly high moral character of targets who have both 
higher power and higher status. 
 In comparison with the expected moral qualities of evaluation targets surveyed 
prior to the group game, behavioral expectations recorded during the game serve as a 
supplementary measure. A pattern for expected behavior shows that participants 
frequently anticipated the evaluation targets to send truthful messages or no messages 
to the other partner. Table 6-20 reports the likelihood of participants expecting moral 
conduct from evaluation targets with variable amounts of power and status. 
Table 6-20 Proportion of Expected Moral Behavior across Power and Status Conditions 
 Sending Truthful or  No Messages N 
   
Higher Power 0.81 (0.24) 84 
Lower Power 0.82 (0.24) 82 
   
Higher Status 0.78 (0.26) 84 
Lower Status 0.85 (0.22) 82 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Throughout six rounds of the game, participants did not assume that higher-
power and lower-power evaluation targets would take different actions when 
communicating with the other partner (z = -0.33; two-tailed p = .744). To be precise, 
participants expected both types of evaluation targets to send a truthful message or 
choose not to send a message in roughly five out of six rounds. On the other hand, 
Table 6-20 displays lower expectation of honest action for higher-status targets than 





targets, participants seemed to anticipate those with higher status to act less morally. 
However, such gap was not statistically significant (z = -1.06; two-tailed p = .289). 
 Furthermore, I utilized these data to investigate associations between the 
anticipated action from evaluation targets and severity of the proposed punishment for 
the targets. Specifically, the analyses reveal how participants responded with 
punishment when they expected (or did not expect) deceptive behavior of the 
evaluation targets. In general, Pearson’s correlation tests demonstrate that expected 
moral behavior was negatively associated with stronger punishment both before (r = -
0.175; two-tailed p = .024) and after the punishment allotments were adjusted (r = -
0.129; two-tailed p = .097). That is, participants were less likely to penalize target 
persons for sending false messages if they first assumed that the targets were honest. 
Conversely, participants tended to apply harsher punishment to targets from whom they 
predicted deception. Further analysis reveals that these associations were statistically 
significant only when the targets had lower power (before adjustment: r = -0.225; two-
tailed p = .041, after adjustment: r = -0.221; two-tailed p = .046) or higher status than 
participants (before adjustment: r = -0.236; two-tailed p = .030, after adjustment: r = -
0.235; two-tailed p = .031).14 
Finally, participants reflected on experiences with the evaluation targets during 
the game and described their interests in having the targets as a classmate or friend. 
Table 6-21 displays the associational preferences index for target persons occupying 
various positions of power and status. 
                                                






Table 6-21 Associational Preference Index across Power and Status Conditions 
 Associational Preferences N 
   
Higher Power 3.31 (1.34) 84 
Lower Power 3.23 (1.30) 82 
   
Higher Status 3.37 (1.35) 84 
Lower Status 3.16 (1.28) 82 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Results from Table 6-21 indicate that compared to lower-power evaluation 
targets, participants more strongly desired social ties to higher-power targets even after 
observing their deceptive behavior. However, an ANOVA test reveals no significant 
differences between the power conditions (F = 0.01; p = .941). Likewise, although 
participants appeared to favor those with higher status, differences in the associational 
preference rating were not statistically significant between higher-status and lower-











Section 3 Discussion 
 Evidence from Study 2 does not support most of my predictions. Results did 
not confirm Hypothesis 1 that observers will produce lower moral expectations about 
evaluation targets with higher power compared to those with lower power. Specifically, 
participants did not develop different levels of moral expectations about the two types 
of evaluation targets. However, the study confirmed Hypothesis 2 that participants 
expected those with higher status relative to lower status to hold higher morality. 
 In support of Hypothesis 3, participants did rely more on the amount of status 
than the amount of power held by evaluation targets when producing moral 
expectations about the targets. Results from ANOVA models indicate that moral 
expectations about the target persons varied by status of the targets. Conversely, such 
expectations did not differ between the level of power held by the targets. Post-hoc 
analyses also reveal a greater proportion of variance explained by status, an indication 
of stronger association. Moreover, as results of the interaction between power and 
status suggest, occupying both higher power and higher status positions received a 
boost in moral expectations. 
 I found no evidence supporting Hypothesis 4A stating that observers of moral 
violations will view the conduct of higher-power violators as more immoral and punish 
them more harshly compared to lower-power violators. Specifically, participants did 
not judge or penalize the two types of violators differently. In other words, those with 
greater power relative to lower power did not draw harsher treatment for committing 





less severely if they had not anticipated the observed deception but would punish harder 
if they had expected the immoral behavior of the violators. 
 Similarly, no support was identified for Hypothesis 4B stating that observers of 
moral violations will perceive the behavior of higher-status violators as more immoral 
but punish them less harshly compared to lower-status violators. Results show that 
participants did not differentially criticize or penalize violators of various status. That 
is, relative to lower-status violators, those with higher status were not treated leniently 
for breaking moral codes. However, participants would favor weaker punishment if 
they had believed in the honesty of higher-status violators. Conversely, participants 
were likely to propose tougher sanctions if they had expected these higher-status 
violators to act immorally. 
 Results did not confirm Hypothesis 5 predicting that compared to those with 
lower power, observers of moral violations will impose weaker punishment on higher-
power violators who retaliate against them. Specifically, participants did not propose 
disparate amounts of punishment for the two types of violators when they could 
retaliate. In other words, violators with higher power relative to lower power did not 
receive weaker penalties when they were capable of more damaging retaliatory tactics. 
The findings were not surprising because participants did not sanction both types of 
violators differently between low-risk and high-risk retaliation conditions. It is possible 
that fears of retaliation from violators did not pose an impact on participants or these 







 There are several limitations of this study concerning the implementation of 
manipulations and the overall experimental design. First, the manipulation of different 
levels of power was not sufficiently rigorous as numerous participants did not correctly 
identify the amount of power held by evaluation targets. I followed the definition of 
power as the ability to achieve goals despite the wishes of others and operationalized 
higher power as having the control over extra earnings in the study. However, I did not 
provide participants with details about how points earned during the study would be 
transferred into cash payments. Additionally, a narrow gap between the maximum and 
minimum cash payments advertised to participants might not have been effective. 
Therefore, participants were unlikely to recognize ample differences in the ability to 
affect material gains. Furthermore, since lower-power evaluation targets did not have 
access to distributing extra earnings in the study, they lacked the capability to retaliate 
against observers who punished them. In comparison with higher-power targets, 
denying lower-power targets this capability removed any chance for retaliation. 
 Second, the approach to manipulating status was slightly excessive and 
complex. Plenty of participants reported low believability in the contrast sensitivity test, 
which undoubtedly impacted their experiences with fictitious partners. Additionally, 
the crafted test performances, as well as demographic and academic information 
utilized to differentiate higher and lower status, were perceived as somewhat bogus. 
Several participants noted that profiles of the partners aligned perfectly with two 
extreme stereotypes of people. Moreover, without crossing the demographic and 





confounding factors. Taken together, a simplified method for status manipulation is 
possible. 
 Third, although power and status are conceptually and empirically distinct, 
participants clearly conflated the two constructs in the study. Rejection rates were 
particularly high in two experimental conditions where the evaluation targets had lower 
power with higher status or higher power with lower status relative to participants. 
Study instructions indicated that status was tied to performance of the game where 
players worked together to earn tokens. That is, perceived competence was somehow 
associated with the ability to obtain resources. As a result, it is very likely that 
participants considered higher-status targets to be powerful and those with lower status 
to be less powerful in the success of obtaining tokens. Even when additional questions 
were included to more explicitly assess perceived levels of power, responses from 
participants still identified a translation of status to the control over material outcomes. 
 Fourth, the nature of the moral violation employed in the study was not 
adequately strong. Survey responses show that across experimental conditions 
participants found the conduct of the violators fairly excusable. Moreover, during the 
game, a third option which allowed the violators to play neutrally by not sending 
messages to partners did not render the violators’ behavior of sending deceptive 
messages unacceptable to participants. Although it reflected a deliberate intent to serve 
one’s own interests at the expense of others, participants did not appear to react 
accordingly to such indication. After all, sending false messages in a game setting to 





not have identified with a purpose to punish observed deception; not to mention they 
had to punish at the cost of their own potential earnings. 
 Finally, as much as the victim (i.e., the receiver, Partner B) was given both a 
limited role and equivalent amounts of power and status to participants, they might still 
have affected participants’ moral decision-making process out of potential preferences 
for similar others. During the briefing, some participants reflected that they punished 
the violators in order to satisfy their high-status victim partners while others 
emphasized that they chose to punish more when their decisions were known to the 
















Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In this chapter, I will first provide a discussion that integrates findings from 
both Study 1 and Study 2. Then an overall conclusion will connect implications of these 
studies to the broader literature on power, status, and morality. In the end, I will close 
with potential avenues for future research. 
 
Section 1 Discussion 
 My dissertation aimed to address how the levels of power and status of moral 
violators affect reactions from observers of the violations. I approached the question 
by first assuming that previous moral expectations developed by the observer about the 
violator play a role. Additionally, I considered the relative resources accessible to the 
violator to be an important factor. Taken together, I proposed that, prior to the violation, 
the observer would form moral expectations about the violator on the basis of the 
amount of power and status held by the violator. Later when witnessing immorality 
committed by the violator, the observer would judge and punish, taking into account 
moral expectations about the violator as well as the resources attached to the power and 
status positions occupied by the violator. Following my proposed theory, I made and 
tested multiple predictions regarding outcomes of the two studies. 
 First, I predicted that observers would develop lower moral expectations about 
higher-power relative to lower-power evaluation targets. Results from Study 1 
supported this hypothesis, but no supporting evidence was found in Study 2. 





hypothetically had power over them to be less moral. However, in a context like Study 
2, where participants were subject to the power of the target person they interacted with, 
they anticipated similar levels of morality from targets with either higher or lower 
power. It is plausible that the power manipulations employed in Study 2 did not 
successfully deliver differential levels of perceived power. Alternatively, participants 
associated higher status with higher power, which is not uncommon in social 
psychological experiments. In other words, the positive effect of higher status on moral 
expectations might have overshadowed the negative effect of higher power, leading to 
non-significant findings. 
 In terms of status, I predicted that observers would develop higher moral 
expectations about higher-status compared to lower-status evaluation targets. Both 
Study 1 and Study 2 lent strong support to this hypothesis. Indeed, regardless of context, 
evaluation targets who were conferred greater respect from participants received 
expectations of a higher moral standing. 
 Given the assumption of a moral component to the status attainment process in 
the literature, I hypothesized that observers would build moral expectations about 
evaluation targets more on the level of status than on the level of power held by the 
targets. Findings from both studies supported the prediction. When power and status 
were examined simultaneously, relative to power, the amount of status not only more 
significantly predicted moral expectations but also contributed to a greater magnitude 
of the effect. However, results might have reflected an order effect in Study 1 where 
participants always responded to questions about moral expectations right after being 





including contrast sensitivity test and demographics, compared with only one method 
of power manipulation. In addition, although analyses from Study 1 revealed no 
interaction between power and status, tests conducted in Study 2 suggested a positive 
interactive effect of higher status with higher power on moral expectations. 
 Furthermore, I predicted that observers of moral violations would judge and 
punish higher-power violators more harshly compared to lower-power violators. 
Results only partially supported this hypothesis. Across two studies, participants 
perceived the conduct of violators as immoral regardless of the amount of power held 
by the violators. Regarding punishment, participants proposed tougher sanctions for 
higher-power relative to lower-power violators in Study 1 but did not punish them 
differently in Study 2. Several explanations are possible for the non-significant findings 
from the second study. Moral expectations did not vary by level of power, and therefore 
did not translate into differential punishment decisions of participants. Moreover, to 
impose a penalty was materially costlier for participants when they personally 
experienced instead of simply perceiving the power of violators. Alternatively, the 
conflation of perceived power and status by participants might have affected their 
decisions to punish. 
 To examine similar outcomes with respect to status order, I predicted that 
observers of moral violations would judge the act of higher-status violators more 
strictly but punish them less severely compared to lower-status violators. Supporting 
evidence for this hypothesis was limited. Results from the two studies indicated harsh 
views on the conduct of violators across the status spectrum. As to punishment, 





in Study 1 but were not penalized differently in Study 2. It is likely that participants in 
the second study perceived those with greater status as powerful in determining the 
earnings of others, and therefore would like to punish higher-status violators. 
Alternatively, participants might have simply felt frustrated about the deceptive 
behavior of higher-status violators. 
 Finally, concerning the differential risks of retribution, I predicted that 
observers of moral violations would punish higher-power violators less severely 
compared to lower-power violators when these violators could retaliate. However, I 
found no support for this hypothesis in Study 2. Considering the constraint that lower-
power violators were not really capable of retribution, participants should have been 
more sensitive to the ability of higher-power violators to make reprisals. Instead, 
participants allocated similar amounts of punishment for both types of violators when 
facing either a low risk or a high risk of retaliation. Therefore, as opposed to my 
prediction, results indicated that fear of retaliation did not affect the punishing behavior 
of participants. Alternative explanations include unsuccessful implementations of risky 
scenarios and power manipulation. 
 
Limitations 
 With respect to explanations about my predictions that failed to be supported 
by data, two main possibilities exist. To begin, my proposed theory could have 
incorrectly assumed how individuals respond to moral violations and mistakenly did 
not identify what types of moral violations were to be measured. As revealed in my 





status held by the violators. However, I argue that it is not because the power and status 
characteristics of violators do not affect the reactions of observers, but because I failed 
to connect those characteristics to the violators’ behavior. Logically, controlling for all 
other factors, including power and status, observers should apply relevant moral norms 
to a specific type of violation, thus rendering similar responses. If these norms have 
nothing to do with the attainment or exertion of power and influence, observers are not 
likely to react differentially to violators holding varied levels of power and status. In 
other words, when the immoral conduct does not concern whether or not the violators 
manage the amount of power and status they have in a morally acceptable manner, the 
observers may overlook the power and status characteristics of the violators. They may 
apply moral norms associated with that specific type of conduct, which would lead to 
no differences in the reactions to various types of violators. As a result, it is important 
to appropriately define moral violations, allowing the effects of power and status to 
come into play. 
 Moreover, methodological limitations could have led to the non-significant 
findings of my studies. Although the laboratory environment in Study 2 more 
sophisticatedly created an experience for participants to witness and react to moral 
violations compared to Study 1, the research design did not appropriately control for 
the correlation between power and status. As discussed in Chapter 6, the manipulation 
of status as a perceived competence associated with an ability to accumulate material 
resources might have facilitated the conflation of perceived power and status by 
participants. Therefore, the predicted opposing effects of violators’ power and status 





deceptive actions aligning with the purpose of the games were likely justified and even 
seen as a competent behavior for higher-status violators. Furthermore, given no details 
about the retaliatory capacity of violators with respect to material loss, participants did 
not appear to identify differential risks of retaliation for punishing the violators. Instead, 
some participants treated the high-risk condition as an opportunity to publicly 
communicate their dissatisfaction. In the next section, I addressed possible 
improvements for my studies if I were to conduct the research again in the future. 
There are other limitations of the studies worth mentioning. First, results from 
the laboratory experiments were not able to replicate what I found in the online vignette 
study. When similar measures from Study 1 were investigated further in a more 
controlled environment of Study 2, several hypotheses ended up not being supported. 
The association between higher power and lower moral expectations had weakened in 
the second study partially because of unsuccessful power manipulations. Moreover, 
participants punished differently on the basis of violators’ power and status in Study 1 
but invariably penalized violators in Study 2. Such changes in sanctioning behavior 
could result from the experimental setting of the second study where participants were 
directly subject to the power and status of interacting partners rather than in 
hypothetical scenarios. Alternatively, it could be due to substantial costs entailed. All 
in all, caution is needed when interpreting and drawing conclusions from the 
inconsistent results. 
 Second, examples of moral violations utilized in my research included only 
deception and reckless damage to property. A deceptive action can be justified in a 





even less harmful. While the immoral behaviors were depicted as unambiguous and 
obtrusive, the research settings diminished their potentially negative consequences. It 
is likely that as the violations become more serious, observers would alter punishing 
behavior. Conceivably, what it means to be in violation of moral principles varies by 
person and context. 
 Third, I did not include emotion assessments in Study 2, out of concerns for 
potential spillover effects resulting from the initial assignments of participants to power 
and status positions, as research has indicated (Lovaglia and Houser 1996). I introduced 
a negative emotion index in Study 1 for preliminary analysis. Although results were 
not significant, they captured some aspects of the sentiments at play. Further research 
is required to isolate and fully examine the emotional factors involved in judging and 
punishing immoral conduct. 
 Finally, the artificial and highly controlled experimental settings in both studies 
could not represent individual experiences in the real world. The controlled 
environments allowed for testing hypotheses and causation with more precision and 
certainty. However, because they did not create realistic situations, the responses of 
participants documented in the research might not have reflected the true indicators of 
these complex behavior in real-life situations. 
 
Section 2 Overall Conclusion 
 This research describes a series of structural and psychological factors 
contributing to the responses of individuals who witness moral violations. In particular, 





violators as well as the resources available to violators. Much of the research evidence 
reveals an association of moral expectations with the levels of power and status held 
by the violators. However, these expectations developed by observers, along with the 
retaliation risks they face for punishing the violators, do not necessarily lead observers 
to make differential judgment and punishment decisions. Overall, the results speak to 
the resilience of power and status order where, relative to their lower-standing 
counterparts, higher-power violators are likely not to be punished as harshly and 
higher-status violators are likely to be punished more leniently for breaking moral 
codes. 
My work extends research in the group processes tradition by exploring a moral 
component in the development of power and status hierarchies. Previous investigations 
suggested a connection between morality and the characteristics of power and status. 
Specifically, the utilization of power for personal gains is seen as selfish (Willer et al. 
2012, 2005), whereas having status makes individuals appear fair and helpful (Flynn 
2003; Flynn et al. 2006). My research establishes a link between expectations of lower 
morality and higher power as well as between expectations of higher morality and 
higher status. The association between power and moral expectations is relatively weak 
because as an attachment to a structural position, power is affected by both the 
boundary of the structure and the way it is being exercised. As I argued, having the 
ability to abuse power does not necessarily mean one would wield that power in an 
abusive manner. Conversely, morality is perceived as an element of attaining status that 





 Conflating power and status in my experiment helps further the understanding 
of the ways the two constructs interact. Although power and status are theoretically 
distinct, due to their strong correlation, the differences sometimes appear to become 
lost in the minds of individuals. Compared to being remotely affected in Study 1, in a 
context like Study 2 where individuals were subject to the power and status of 
interacting partners, they more often regarded those with higher status as powerful and 
those with lower status as less powerful in effecting changes in material outcomes. 
Plausible reasons include that individuals were more likely to witness competent 
performances or experience the influence of those holding higher status. Therefore, 
they might have missed experimental cues about the incongruent amounts of power 
and status held by the partners. Alternatively, they might have had difficulty 
reconciling the inconsistency and decided to simply follow the cues about perceived 
status. Furthermore, such transference between power and status reflects the 
meritocratic beliefs that high-status persons should or would exhibit the ability to 
control resources. Altogether, power and status are highly correlated and often 
conflated in the eyes of the observers. 
 This research advances work on status processes by articulating how contextual 
beliefs of competence facilitate to maintain the influence of status. For instance, a well-
respected person in the workplace might be punished less harshly for hitting a parked 
car because their perceived competence with respect to job performance is not impacted 
by their misconduct. Likewise, individuals who are believed to excel at a game may 
not be penalized severely for lying to partners when they are seen as playing 





behavior does not contradict beliefs of competence, a high-status person is likely to 
retain influence over others. 
 In addition, the research helps shed light on both the effects of evaluation targets’ 
low power and low status on the perceived morality developed by observers. 
Specifically, having the least amount of power did not seem to affect the judgment and 
punishment decisions of observers. On the other hand, having the least amount of status 
prompted observers to form lower moral expectations and apply tougher sanctions for 
wrongdoings. Similarly, observers were less likely to consider low-status evaluation 
targets to be hypocritical for immoral conduct compared to those with higher status. It 
is plausible that observers attribute the low status rank of the targets to prior 
misbehavior. Relative to those with high status, when the low-status evaluation targets 
commit moral violations, observers may find it less surprising and punish more 
severely for validating low moral qualities. 
 
Future Directions 
 To start, I offer an overview of possible methods to improve my study design 
in the future provided that the predictions are true. I would still apply an experimental 
methodology as it is the most appropriate way to test the elements of my proposed 
theory. First, to better control for its correlation with power, the manipulation for status 
would not be associated with an ability to acquire material resources. Task performance 
and completion are equally useful in producing perceptions of competence for various 
levels of status. In addition, to limit potential confounding effects, I would focus on 





diversify and compare multiple attributes of the evaluation targets. Meanwhile, the 
amount of power could vary by the extent of behavioral change in those who are subject 
to the power. For instance, supervisors could exercise power by giving orders to 
subordinates. Second, the devised moral violations should not confuse the purposes of 
other tasks implemented in the experiment. Otherwise, participants may utilize 
standards in addition to morality in evaluating the violations. For example, verbal abuse 
and other types of bullying behavior during communication with interacting partners 
would not be expected or excusable. Other examples include incidents of bribery, 
embezzlement, and fraud. Third, to more successfully instill fear of retaliation, it would 
be beneficial to set precedents for revengeful acts, letting participants recognize the 
retaliatory capacity of violators. I predict that observers would respond differently 
when violators can retaliate against them. The reason behind different responses is not 
so much the means or setting as the potential damage that the violators could bring onto 
the observers. Therefore, it is important for observers to be fully aware that violators 
can and will retaliate when the violators see fit. 
This research has broader implications for studies in sociological social 
psychology. Despite a resilient power and status order in groups after moral violations, 
responses may in fact be dynamic at the individual level. That is, individuals could be 
reacting to the change of power and status cues in a variety of aspects. For one, 
consistent perceptions of behavior with moral expectations may provoke negative 
sentiments toward powerful violators, whereas inconsistencies between perceived and 
expected behavior are likely to intensify frustration with high-status violators. 





responses in observers that affect approaches to addressing the immorality. For 
example, feeling distressed could help direct actions toward reducing the suffering of 
victims while anger likely motivates sanctions to violators. As discussed earlier, 
emotion is a crucial factor in defining the moral meanings of the situation and deciding 
how to respond accordingly, and therefore is worthy of greater scrutiny. 
 Other aspects to consider include trust and empathy. Moral expectations can 
illuminate discussions on trustworthiness and perceived empathy in that morality is a 
core element of trustworthy and empathic relationships between individuals (Hoffman 
2001; Simpson, Harrell, and Willer 2013). Emerging questions for this line of research 
can be: do moral expectations affect trust in persons who have differential levels of 
power and status? Further, would individuals empathize with others more if they 
believed themselves to have a higher moral character? How would empathy affect the 
responses of observers to both victims and violators? Inquiries into group dynamics are 
equivalently meaningful. For example, when an immoral incident takes place in a group, 
how would the group cope with the violation and reestablish trust between members at 
various power and status positions? Answers to these questions are particularly 
imperative in the event of a moral violation. 
The differential processes that observers attribute status to evaluation targets 
potentially affect the ways observers judge after the targets commit violations. I 
assumed a competence-based approach to attaining status in the studies; however, in 
reality, people confer status for varying conditions and reasons, and these contexts may 
add complexity in investigating observers’ reactions. An example would be a potential 





membership identified by observers could mean less affinity and thus stricter judgment 
for out-group higher-status violators relative to those who enjoy in-group favoritism. 
In addition, what constitutes the group boundaries have implications for the type of act 
that may or may not be defined as immoral. Furthermore, similar to the distinction 
between observed and relative contexts in my experiments, research shows that the 
status order formed in a person’s immediate network compared with loose connections 
had a stronger effect on individual psychological well-being (Anderson et al. 2012). 
That is, the meanings and commitment that observers attach to the status relations could 
also affect responses to moral violations committed by individuals who are situated in 
these relations. Overall, the above discussions explore potential directions that this line 
of research can take. 
Relative to persons of differential power, the retaliatory ability of those with 
status is less clear regarding the means and extent of making a reprisal. It is conceivable 
that powerful violators are capable of utilizing material resources to carry out a 
retaliation. In comparison, violators who have greater status than observers appear to 
have a diversity of methods to resort to. For example, they may wield influence to 
organize collective efforts against observers who punish them in the first place. Or, 
they could try overturning the punishment decisions of the observers. Furthermore, they 
are likely to seek positions of power and then use the resources accessible to the 
positions. Therefore, subsequent studies are needed to clarify the potential retaliatory 
behavior of high-status individuals. 
This research offers a number of directions worthwhile to pursue regarding 





relationships between the parties involved. As the literature has shown, both negative 
intentions and contradictions to perceived competence are critical in judging high-
status violators (Shaw and Skolnick 1996; Wahrman 1970). Further, as the severity of 
violations intensifies, lenient treatments toward high-status violators may become less 
likely. Another related aspect in responding to moral violations is ambiguity which can 
refer to the process of defining immorality or attributing accountability to violators. For 
instance, equivocally defined moral violations may result in permissive attitudes of 
observers toward violators at higher relative to lower standing. However, observers are 
likely to react strongly to high-power or high-status violators in particular when these 
violators are deemed undisputedly responsible for their behavior. The acknowledged 
liability could undermine the perceived legitimacy of high-ranking violators, deny their 
use of power and influence, and further contribute to their loss of power and status. 
Additionally, a lack of proper accountability arrangements could exacerbate 
condemnations on high-standing violators given their possibility of being able to escape 
without penalty. 
Moreover, immoral conduct that concerns values other than care and justice 
deserves greater attention because the definition of morality varies by culture and 
context. According to Haidt (2012), moral principles involve other aspects such as 
loyalty to groups, legitimate authority, and a state of sanctity. For instance, observers 
may expect high-status members to display greater loyalty compared to low-status 
members by making sacrifices for groups. Additionally, as discussed above, higher-
ranking violators of power and status are likely to be penalized severely for not acting 





receive tough sanctions for non-compliance. Another example would be a behavior that 
concerns the sanctity of life. To illustrate, consuming or making physical contact with 
specific contaminants could be a more offensive violation for higher-status relative to 
lower-status evaluation targets. Perhaps, to some religious traditions being pure and 
divine is the upmost trait of a high status. As a result, future research should be careful 
about generalizing beyond circumstances of a particular moral violation. 
According to my proposed theory, cognitive and emotional responses to 
witnessed moral violations influence how individuals decide to take measures to restore 
the moral balance. It specifies that individuals would consider both developed 
expectations about and their relative positions to violators when making judgment and 
punishment decisions. This research fills in a piece of the human puzzle about 
maintaining the moral order when it clashes with elements of social stratification. 
Meanwhile, it calls for future endeavors to further develop a well-grounded 






Appendix A: Study 1 Study Materials 
MTurk Recruitment Post Page 
We are a team of researchers at the University of Maryland interested in attitudes 
toward people at various social standing. The study involves a survey which asks you 
to evaluate individuals and their behavior described in scenarios and a few questions 
about yourself. The entire study will take about 10 minutes to complete. 
There are no known risks associated with participating in this study. There will be no 
direct benefits to you for participation, but it may help researchers. Your responses 
and opinions will remain anonymous. No information that we collect may personally 
identify you. Your participation is voluntary. 
You will be rewarded $1 for completing the survey with satisfactory quality. That is, 
we will consider answers to questions designed to determine whether you are paying 
attention. If we suspect that you do not qualify for the study, or proper attention was 
not given to responses, we may reject your submission and not issue payment. Please 
note that you may only participate in this study once. 
 
If you have any questions about the research, you can contact the Principal 
Investigator at GroupsResearchUMD@gmail.com or the University of Maryland 
Institutional Review Board at irb@umd.edu, (301) 405-4212. 
By clicking “Accept” below, you are indicating that you currently live in the U.S., 
you are at least 18 years old and fluent in English, you have read the consent 
information, your questions have been answered, and you voluntarily agree to 
participate in this study. 
 
The survey is conducted through another website. When you are ready to begin, click the link below to 
open the survey in a NEW browser tab or window. Make sure to leave this window open at all 
















1a. Higher Power 
 
 
1b. Equal Power 
 
 








2a. Higher Status 
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Appendix B: Study 1 Supplemental Analysis 
Mediation Analysis Using Collapsed Data 
 
The logic behind the results of Study 1 informed the exploratory causal analysis. 
Specifically, both power and status significantly affect moral expectations and 
punishment options. Therefore, I conducted mediation analysis to examine whether 
moral expectations mediate the effects of power and status on punishment for violators. 
As reported in Chapter 5, moral expectations mediated the effect of power on 
moral punishment. I conducted an additional sensitivity analysis to assess the 
robustness of the result.15 The analysis suggests that the mediated effect would become 
zero in the presence of unmeasured confounding variables that were moderately related 
(ρ = -0.313) to the mediator and outcome even after conditioning on power level (see 
Figure B-1). In other words, the mediated relationship could turn out to be non-
significant if the modestly correlated variables were included in the regression model. 
                                                
15 Sensitivity analysis is designed to quantify how strong the confounder would have to be to 







Figure B-1 Sensitivity Analysis for the Effect of Power on Moral Punishment 
 
In terms of status, results demonstrate a significant mediator of moral 
expectations between status and moral punishment. However, the sensitivity analysis 
shows that a moderate degree of unmeasured confounding (ρ = -0.276) would render a 
mediated effect no longer significant (see Figure B-2). 
 














































Results from Separate Data Collected in Relative and Observed Contexts 
 
Table B-1 Average Scores of Moral Expectations by Power and Status in Different Contexts 
 Relative Context Observed Context 
   
Power   
     High Power 5.28 (1.32) 5.40 (1.46) 
     Equal Power 5.52 (1.50) 5.83 (1.24) 
     Low Power 5.68 (1.48) 6.07 (1.30) 
Status   
     High Status 6.02 (1.35) 6.49 (1.03) 
     Equal Status 5.96 (1.28) 6.06 (0.91) 
     Low Status 4.50 (1.14) 4.74 (1.41) 
Standard deviations in parentheses.   
 
 
Table B-2 T-Tests for Expectation Scores between Power Conditions by Context 
 t-value N 
   
Relative Context   
     High to Equal -1.05 150 
     Equal to Low -0.68 150 
     High to Low -1.79 150 
Observed Context   
     High to Equal -1.96 150 
     Equal to Low -1.15 150 
     High to Low -2.97** 150 







Table B-3 T-Tests for Expectation Scores between Status Conditions by Context 
 t-value N 
   
Relative Context   
     High to Equal 0.28 150 
     Equal to Low 7.41*** 150 
     High to Low 7.49*** 150 
Observed Context   
     High to Equal 2.73** 150 
     Equal to Low 6.77*** 150 
     High to Low 8.65*** 150 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05; Two-tailed test 
 
Table B-4 Regression Analysis for Expectation Scores across Power and Status Conditions in 
Relative Context 
Independent Variables Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
   
Higher Power -0.182 -0.104 
 (0.106)  
Higher Status 0.763*** 0.434 
 (0.106)  
Female 0.377* 0.128 
 (0.179)  
Age 0.003 0.023 
 (0.009)  
Race 0.102 0.083 
 (0.075)  
Education -0.074 -0.043 
 (0.106)  
Subjective SES -0.075 -0.080 
 (0.059)  
   
R-squared 0.2305 
225 N 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05; Two-tailed test 






Table B-5 Regression Analysis for Expectation Scores across Power and Status Conditions in 
Observed Context 
Independent Variables Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
   
Higher Power -0.324** -0.195 
 (0.093)  
Higher Status 0.879*** 0.530 
 (0.093)  
Female 0.069 0.025 
 (0.153)  
Age 0.002 0.016 
 (0.007)  
Race 0.004 0.003 
 (0.063)  
Education -0.091 -0.061 
 (0.092)  
Subjective SES -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.049)  
   
R-squared 0.3234 
225 N 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05; Two-tailed test 













Table B-6 Average Scores of Moral Judgment and Punishment by Power in Different 
Contexts 
 Judgment Punishment 
   
Relative Context   
     High Power 7.23 (1.02) 5.91 (1.24) 
     Equal Power 7.16 (1.09) 5.67 (1.28) 
     Low Power 7.27 (0.83) 5.33 (1.17) 
Observed Context   
     High Power 7.30 (0.95) 5.54 (1.11) 
     Equal Power 7.28 (1.08) 5.43 (1.26) 
     Low Power 7.30 (0.93) 5.48 (1.27) 
Standard deviations in parentheses.   
 
 
Table B-7 T-Tests for Judgment and Punishment Scores between Power Conditions by 
Context 
 Judgment Punishment N 
    
Relative Context    
     High to Equal 0.36 1.14 150 
     Equal to Low -0.68 1.72 150 
     High to Low -0.29 2.93** 150 
Observed Context    
     High to Equal 0.13 0.55 150 
     Equal to Low -0.14 -0.21 150 
     High to Low 0 0.32 150 








Table B-8 Average Scores of Moral Judgment and Punishment by Status in Different 
Contexts 
 Judgment Punishment 
   
Relative Context   
     High Status 7.33 (0.85) 5.65 (1.24) 
     Equal Status 7.08 (1.19) 5.48 (1.36) 
     Low Status 7.24 (0.87) 5.78 (1.14) 
Observed Context   
     High Status 7.15 (1.21) 5.24 (1.10) 
     Equal Status 7.32 (0.83) 5.37 (1.21) 
     Low Status 7.42 (0.86) 5.84 (1.26) 
Standard deviations in parentheses.   
 
 
Table B-9 T-Tests for Judgment and Punishment Scores between Status Conditions by 
Context 
 Judgment Punishment N 
    
Relative Context    
     High to Equal 1.48 0.82 150 
     Equal to Low -0.94 -1.50 150 
     High to Low 0.63 -0.69 150 
Observed Context    
     High to Equal -0.97 -0.71 150 
     Equal to Low -0.74 -2.30* 150 
     High to Low -1.56 -3.09** 150 








Table B-10 Means of Emotional and Perceptual Measures by Power in Different Contexts 







     
Relative Context     
     High Power 7.23 (1.30) 4.67 (2.30) 5.71 (1.92) 6.19 (2.25) 
     Equal Power 7.21 (1.32) 4.21 (2.34) 5.64 (1.74) 5.93 (2.23) 
     Low Power 7.43 (1.37) 4.19 (2.13) 5.33 (1.79) 5.96 (2.03) 
Observed Context     
     High Power 7.47 (1.35) 3.73 (2.06) 5.33 (1.59) 7.44 (1.15) 
     Equal Power 7.68 (1.44) 3.55 (2.49) 517 (2.05) 7.55 (1.00) 
     Low Power 7.93 (1.36) 3.41 (2.35) 5.37 (1.91) 7.36 (1.16) 
Standard deviations in parentheses.     
 
 
Table B-11 T-Tests for Emotional and Perceptual Measures between Power Conditions by 
Context 







      
Relative Context      
     High to Equal 0.13 1.19 0.22 0.69 150 
     Equal to Low -1.04 0.07 1.06 -0.08 150 
     High to Low -0.92 1.33 1.23 0.65 150 
Observed Context      
     High to Equal -0.89 -0.46 0.53 -0.60 150 
     Equal to Low -1.11 0.34 -0.62 1.05 150 
     High to Low -2.07* -0.11 -0.14 0.42 150 









Table B-12 Means of Emotional and Perceptual Measures by Status in Different Contexts 







     
Relative Context     
     High Status 7.34 (1.37) 4.19 (2.32) 5.75 (1.82) 6.09 (2.19) 
     Equal Status 7.23 (1.29) 4.13 (2.11) 5.69 (1.92) 5.76 (2.29) 
     Low Status 7.31 (1.35) 4.75 (2.33) 5.24 (1.70) 6.23 (2.01) 
Observed Context     
     High Status 7.83 (1.45) 3.33 (2.30) 5.67 (1.83) 7.36 (1.37) 
     Equal Status 7.65 (1.24) 3.43 (2.22) 5.31 (1.85) 7.44 (0.89) 
     Low Status 7.60 (1.47) 3.57 (2.39) 4.91 (1.82) 7.55 (1.00) 
Standard deviations in parentheses.     
 
 
Table B-13 T-Tests for Emotional and Perceptual Measures between Status Conditions by 
Context 







      
Relative Context      
     High to Equal 0.49 0.15 0.17 0.91 150 
     Equal to Low -0.37 -1.69 1.53 -1.33 150 
     High to Low 0.12 -1.48 1.76 -0.39 150 
Observed Context      
     High to Equal 0.81 -0.25 1.20 -0.42 150 
     Equal to Low 0.24 -0.39 1.33 -0.69 150 
     High to Low 0.97 -0.63 2.55* -0.95 150 








Appendix C: Study 2 Recruitment and Registration Materials 








































Appendix D: Study 2 Study Materials 
Partner Profile Sheet – Used in Condition 1 (Violators have higher power and higher 
status than observers.) 
 
	 Partner	A	 Partner	B	 You	
Gender	 Male	 Female	 	






















Partner Profile Sheet – Used in Condition 2 (Violators have lower power and higher 
status than observers.) 
 
	 Partner	A	 Partner	B	 You	
Gender	 Male	 Female	 	
























Partner Profile Sheet – Used in Condition 3 (Violators have higher power and lower 
status than observers.) 
 
	 Partner	A	 Partner	B	 You	
Gender	 Female	 Male	 	
























Partner Profile Sheet – Used in Condition 4 (Violators have lower power and lower 
status than observers.) 
 
	 Partner	A	 Partner	B	 You	
Gender	 Female	 Male	 	























Questions Regarding Moral Expectation Index and Power/Status Manipulation 


















































































































Group Game Instruction Screens – Messages Used to Manipulate Retaliation Risk 
 













Group Game Instruction Screens – Example of One Round Where the Violator Was 




















Group Game Instruction Screens – Example of One Round Where the Violator Was 













(Depending on the condition of retaliation risk, one of the messages was shown at the 
bottom of this page.) 
Low Retaliation Risk: 
 


























Group Game Instruction Screens – Example of One Round Where the Violator Was 
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